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MAKE-WHOLE OR MAKE-SHORT?
HOW COURTS HAVE MISREAD
TITLE VII’S LIMITATIONS PERIOD
TO TRUNCATE RELIEF IN EEOC
PATTERN-OR-PRACTICE CASES
SARA A. FAIRCHILD*
Section 707 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes the
federal government to sue employers engaged in a pattern or practice of
discrimination. Congress designed these so-called “pattern-or-practice” suits to be
a formidable weapon against the most entrenched and reprehensible Title VII
violations and to provide the public with swift and effective relief. Unlike section
706 of the statute, which furnishes a right of action for individual complainants,
section 707 empowers the government to redress systemic discrimination. The only
procedural requirement that Congress originally prescribed for section 707 cases
was that the government have reasonable cause to believe that an employer was
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination.
In 1972, Congress transferred the government’s pattern-or-practice power
from the U.S. Attorney General to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission in an attempt to strengthen Title VII’s enforcement. In doing so,
it added a provision to section 707, stating that the Commission shall
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investigate and act upon allegations of a pattern or practice of discrimination
“in accordance with the procedures set forth in [section 706].” Like many
private rights of action, section 706 includes a limitations period. Although
the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress intended the EEOC to have
the same authority under section 707 as the Attorney General, numerous
district courts have begun using this provision to apply section 706’s statutory
limitations period to restrict relief in EEOC pattern-or-practice cases. This
Comment argues that such an application conflicts with Congress’s intent,
both in enacting section 707 and in granting the EEOC authority to litigate
section 707 cases. But, even if Congress had intended section 706’s
limitations period to apply to section 707 cases, a pattern or practice of
discrimination is a single, continuing violation for purposes of timely filing.
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INTRODUCTION
“[O]nly by an effective attack on entire systems that discriminate can we have
any significant impact on discrimination . . . .”
—Eleanor Holmes Norton1
From 2003 to 2007, a farm labor contracting firm, Global Horizons,
recruited hundreds of impoverished, uneducated Thai guest workers
to work on six farms in Hawaii.2 Global Horizons charged these Thai
workers exorbitant recruitment fees to come to the United States,
placing them “hopelessly in debt” and subjected the workers to
slavery-like working conditions to pay off what they owed.3
Supervisors at the farms physically and verbally abused the Thai
workers, forced them to live in uninhabitable sleeping quarters, and
failed to provide adequate food and water.4 Meanwhile, the farms
allowed other, non-Thai workers significantly greater freedoms and
1. Overhauling the EEOC, 28 LAB. L.J. 683, 690 (1977) (emphasis added).
Eleanor Holmes Norton served as the first female Chair of the EEOC from June 1977
to February 1981. Deborah Churchman, Eleanor Norton Reflects on Equal-Employment
Successes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 3, 1981, at 19; Lawrence Speiser, A Look at
Eleanor Norton Holmes, DISTRICT LAW., Aug.–Sept. 1979, at 19.
2. EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1081 (D. Haw. 2012);
Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 268, 323, 373, 432, 511, 560, 624, Glob. Horizons, 904
F. Supp. 2d 1074 (No. 11-00257), 2012 WL 10007945. The farms that contracted
Global Horizons to supply foreign workers were owned by Captain Cook Coffee Co.,
Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawaii), Kauai Coffee Co., Kelena Farms, Mac Farms of
Hawaii, Maui Pineapple Co., and Alexander & Baldwin. Glob. Horizons, 904 F. Supp.
2d at 1074–75, 1081.
3. EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., No. 11-00257, 2014 WL 7338725, at *3–4 (D.
Haw. Dec. 19, 2014).
4. Id. at *3–6.
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amenities.5 While non-Thai workers could own a car, drink alcohol,
listen to music, cook their own food, and take work breaks, Thai workers
could not.6 The farms also paid Thai workers less—and, sometimes, not
at all.7 Global Horizons’s CEO later admitted that he “specifically sought
Thai nationals to fulfill the farm labor contracts believing that Thai
workers would be easier to exploit than workers from other national
origins and/or races.”8 When the Thai workers complained to Global
Horizons, its management threatened to deport them.9
In April 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) sued Global Horizons and these farms under section 707 of
Title VII, alleging that the companies had engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination against the Thai workers based on their
national origin.10 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees or job applicants
based on one or more protected grounds—race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.11 Section 707 authorizes the EEOC to prosecute
employers that exhibit “a pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of any of the rights secured by [Title VII].”12 Congress
designed these so-called “pattern-or-practice” cases to provide “a swift
and effective weapon” for the government to “vindicate the broad
public interest” in eradicating systemic employment discrimination.13
Since Congress enacted Title VII, however, the procedural
requirements for pattern-or-practice cases have been widely contested.14

5. Id. at *5.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at *3.
9. Id. at *5–6.
10. Third Amended Complaint at 2, EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 904 F. Supp.
2d 1074 (D. Haw. 2012) (No. 11-00257), 2012 WL 10007945.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
12. § 2000e-6(a), (c); see also infra text accompanying notes 54–64 (explaining
that the U.S. Attorney General has the authority to bring pattern-or-practice suits
against public employers, and the EEOC has the authority to bring pattern-orpractice suits against private employers).
13. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 843 (5th Cir. 1975).
Although some scholars have used the phrase “pattern-or-practice case” to describe
certain private class-action lawsuits litigated under section 706 of Title VII, this
Comment uses “pattern-or-practice case” to refer solely to a lawsuit that the
government brings under section 707 of Title VII.
14. See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in
Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10 (1996) (“The amount of
litigation over [the Title VII] procedures is likely unparalleled in federal
administrative law.”).
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One question that has generated considerable litigation is whether the
EEOC can obtain relief for all individuals harmed by a pattern or
practice of discrimination or for only those harmed within a given
statutory time period.15 While section 707 of Title VII does not include
such a limitations period,16 it provides that the EEOC shall investigate
and act upon allegations of a pattern or practice of discrimination “in
accordance with the procedures set forth in” section 706.17
Section 706, in contrast to section 707, affords recourse for
individuals seeking relief from specific instances of employment
discrimination.18 Not surprisingly, section 706 does include a
limitations period, which provides that individuals must file a charge,
or a formal allegation of discrimination, with the government within
180 or 300 days of the discriminatory act.19 Given this requirement, a
private plaintiff, or the government acting on behalf of a private
party, can sue an employer under section 706 only for discriminatory
acts that occurred within 180 or 300 days prior to the charge.20

15. See EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT 09CV2573, 2010 WL 1728847, at *2 (D. Md.
Apr. 27, 2010) (discussing a split among district courts and citing eight decisions:
four in favor of applying a statutory limitations period to pattern-or-practice cases
and four opposed); see also BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 1351 (Paul W. Cane, Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996) (commenting
that Title VII’s limitations period is “arguably the most muddled area in all of
employment discrimination law”).
16. This Comment uses the terms “limitations period” and “filing period”
interchangeably. Both refer to Title VII section 706(e)(1), which provides that
victims of employment discrimination must file a “charge” with the EEOC no more
than 180 or 300 days after the discrimination occurred to be eligible for relief. See
infra text accompanying notes 154–58 (explaining the limitations period and how
courts assess the timeliness of a charge).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5–6.
18. See EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1084 (C.D. Ill.
1998) (distinguishing section 707 cases, which challenge systemic discrimination,
from section 706 cases, which vindicate the rights of individuals challenging discrete
discriminatory acts).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The specific language of the statute reads,
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . except
that in a case . . . [where] the person aggrieved has initially instituted
proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief
from such practice[,] . . . such charge shall be filed . . . within three hundred
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . .
Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101, 109–10 (2002) (interpreting the statute’s language to mean that claimants
have “up to 180 or 300 days after the unlawful practice happened to file a charge” and
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In the Global Horizons case, the defendant employers argued that
the court should apply section 706’s limitations period to the EEOC’s
section 707 claims so that only Thai workers who experienced
discrimination within 180 or 300 days of the triggering charge could
obtain relief.21 The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii
agreed.22 Of the hundreds of Thai workers that Global Horizons and
the defendant farms exploited, only eighty-two ultimately were
awarded compensation.23
Many other district courts have similarly applied section 706’s
limitations period to EEOC pattern-or-practice cases and denied
relief to countless victims of employment discrimination.24 Some
courts, on the other hand, have examined sections 706 and 707 and
concluded that the section 706 limitations period does not apply to
pattern-or-practice actions.25
These courts have reasoned that
application of section 706’s filing requirements simply does not fit
with the history and nature of section 707 cases.26 No court of
appeals has ruled on the issue.27

that claims are “time barred” if not filed within these time limits), superseded in part by
statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
21. EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1090 (D. Haw. 2012).
22. Id. at 1092.
23. See EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., No. 11-00257, 2014 WL 7338725, at *15–16,
*31 (D. Haw. Dec. 19, 2014) (listing the names of the claimants to whom the court
awarded damages).
24. See, e.g., EEOC v. FAPS, Inc., No. 10-3095, 2014 WL 4798802, at *24 (D.N.J.
Sept. 26, 2014) (finding that the section 706 limitations period governed the EEOC’s
section 707 claims and dismissing all claims for discrimination that occurred outside
that period); EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT 09CV2573, 2010 WL 1728847, at *1 (D.
Md. Apr. 27, 2010) (same); EEOC v. Burlington Med. Supplies, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d
647, 659 (E.D. Va. 2008) (same); EEOC v. KCD Constr., Inc., No. 05-2122, 2007 WL
1129220, at *4 (D. Minn. Apr. 16, 2007) (same); EEOC v. Custom Cos., Nos. 02 C
3768, 03 C 2293, 2004 WL 765891, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2004) (same).
25. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., No. 08-706, 2010 WL 86376, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010) (holding that the section 706 limitations period does not
limit the relief that the EEOC may obtain in section 707 cases); EEOC v. LA Weight
Loss, 509 F. Supp. 2d 527, 535–36 (D. Md. 2007) (same); EEOC v. Scolari Warehouse
Mkts., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1137 (D. Nev. 2007) (same); EEOC v. Dial Corp.,
No. 99-3356, 2002 WL 1974072, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2002) (same); EEOC v.
Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1084 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (same).
26. See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 990 F. Supp. at 1083–84 (finding that imposing a
limitations period in section 707 cases is contrary to the “very nature” of a pattern-orpractice action, and that “no statutory language, no regulation, no case, and no
commentator” definitively establishes that section 707 incorporates section 706’s
timely filing requirement).
27. FAPS, 2014 WL 4798802, at *23.
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This Comment argues that upon establishing that an employer
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination under section 707
of Title VII, the EEOC may secure relief for any individual injured by
that pattern or practice. Specifically, this Comment reasons that the
section 706 limitations period does not apply to section 707 cases,
and even if it did, a pattern or practice of discrimination is a single,
continuing violation of Title VII such that the section 706 limitations
period would only bar victims from recovery if the pattern or practice
ended before the EEOC received the initiating charge. Part I begins
by discussing pattern-or-practice cases in the context of Title VII’s
history and the statute’s other enforcement provisions. It then
compares the different purposes, litigation frameworks, and statutory
provisions of section 706 and section 707. Part II examines section
706’s limitations period and how courts have, and have not, applied it
to continuing violations and section 707 cases. Part III draws on the
case law, the language of Title VII, and the general purpose of
section 707 to explain why section 706’s limitations period does not
restrict individual relief in pattern-or-practice cases.
I.

PATTERN-OR-PRACTICE CASES IN CONTEXT

A. The Evolution of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the EEOC
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“the 1964
Act”) to achieve two objectives—“eradicating discrimination
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries
suffered through past discrimination.”28 The representatives who
supported the 1964 Act recognized that “discrimination is harmful
not only to [those] who directly bear it, but to the entire country.”29
Title VII thus prohibits employers30 from discriminating against
employees and applicants based on individuals’ race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.31 The statute contemplates two forms of

28. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (holding that courts
must adhere to these “twin statutory objectives” when awarding back pay to victims of
unlawful employment discrimination), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
29. 110 CONG. REC. 2731 (1964) (statement of Rep. Dawson); see also id. at 2802
(statement of Rep. Vanik) (remarking that “the section on equal employment
opportunities[] should bring our country to higher levels of dignity and national
achievement”).
30. Title VII’s prohibition applies to direct employers, employment agencies, and
labor organizations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)–(c) (2012). This Comment uses the
term “employer” to refer to all three types of entities.
31. § 2000e-2(a). The statute reads,
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unlawful discrimination: disparate treatment, which involves treating
individuals differently based on these protected characteristics, and
disparate impact, which involves using employment practices that have
an unjustifiable disparate impact on these protected groups.32 Title
VII also prohibits employers from retaliating against individuals who
pursue relief under the statute or otherwise participate in a
proceeding to enforce compliance with its terms.33
Title VII’s provisions for achieving its goals and protecting these
rights have changed over time. The 1964 Act covered only private
employers and placed enforcement of Title VII primarily in the
hands of private litigants.34 Although Title VII created the EEOC to
administer the statute’s mandates, the agency initially had no
independent enforcement power.35 Rather, Congress designed the
EEOC to serve primarily as a “screening agent” for potential
lawsuits.36 Individual victims of discrimination who sought relief

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
32. See Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 219, 221–24 (1995) (comparing the two theories of employment
discrimination—disparate treatment and disparate impact—and explaining that
disparate treatment focuses on “the way employers make decisions” while disparate
impact focuses on “the results of such decisions”).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
34. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241, 253
(excluding “the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the
United States, an Indian tribe, or a state or political subdivision thereof” from the
Act’s definition of “employer”); id. §§ 706(e), 707(a) (providing that the only parties
who could file a lawsuit under Title VII were individual victims of discrimination and
the Attorney General, who could only sue in cases where an employer had allegedly
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination).
35. Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A
Critical Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J.
1, 7–8 (1977) (noting that under the original Title VII, the EEOC could only
recommend that the Attorney General pursue a pattern-or-practice suit, file amicus
briefs in private suits, and bring actions against defendant employers who failed to
comply with court orders previously issued in private suits).
36. Id. at 28. Given the EEOC’s limited powers, the agency became known as a
“toothless tiger.” Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement
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under the statute had to file a “charge” with the agency, alleging an
employer had violated Title VII.37 If the EEOC had reason to believe
that an employer had violated Title VII, but the agency had not
received a charge from the victim(s) of that violation, an EEOC
Commissioner could file a so-called “Commissioner’s charge.”38 The
EEOC would then investigate the charge and, if the allegations had
merit, attempt to resolve the matter through conciliation with the
accused employer.39 But, if the EEOC failed to reach an acceptable
settlement, an individual victim’s only recourse was to file a private
employment discrimination lawsuit against the employer in court.40
The 1964 Act’s reliance on victims to serve as “private attorneys
general”41 quickly proved ineffective.42 Not only did individual
victims of discrimination carry the burden of enforcing Title VII’s
provisions through private lawsuits, but the statute’s administrative
procedures often discouraged victims from doing so. For example,
the conciliation process and other statutory requirements
substantially delayed any potential relief.43 The financial rewards—
back pay minus interim earnings—were not worth pursuing for
plaintiffs who worked while waiting for their day in court.44 And,
although the statute allowed courts to award “reasonable” attorney’s
fees at the conclusion of successful lawsuits, the costs of preparing
and litigating these cases deterred many lawyers from undertaking
After 35 Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV.
305, 323 & n.51 (2001) (noting that the EEOC’s first Chief of Conciliations, Alfred
Blumrosen, first coined the term “toothless tiger” to describe how the agency’s lack
of enforcement power hobbled its ability to effect change).
37. Civil Rights Act § 706(a), 78 Stat. at 259.
38. Id.; EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 84 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
39. Civil Rights Act § 706(a), 78 Stat. at 259; see infra Section I.B.2(a) (explaining
section 706’s conciliation requirement).
40. Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 31 BROOK. L. REV. 62, 83, 86 (1964); see Civil Rights Act § 706(e), 78 Stat. at 260
(providing that if “the [EEOC] has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with
this title, the [agency] shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may . . .
be brought against the respondent named in the charge” by the aggrieved person).
41. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 848 (5th Cir. 1975)
(explaining that Title VII depended on private lawsuits to “elicit enunciation of the great
bulk of policies and principles which serve to flesh out the [statute’s] mandate”).
42. In 1967, the EEOC’s second chairman, Stephen N. Shulman, remarked,
“We’re out to kill an elephant with a fly gun.” Hill, supra note 35, at 32 (citing James
P. Gannon, Uphill Bias Fight, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1967, at 1).
43. Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1252–53 (1971) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
44. Id. at 1253.
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them.45 Consequently, fewer than ten percent of the meritorious
claims that did not settle ever reached a court.46
Recognizing that “the individual right to sue, standing alone, is a
poor method of enforcing social legislation designed to alter
institutional patterns of behavior,”47 Congress also included in the
original Title VII a mechanism for the government to challenge
systemic employment discrimination. The statute required employers
within its purview to keep records and make reports as the EEOC
prescribed.48 Based on these records, the EEOC could analyze
companies’ employment statistics to identify employers engaged in a
pattern or practice of discrimination and make recommendations to
the Attorney General accordingly.49 The Attorney General could
then sue these employers in court.50
The pattern-or-practice
provision of Title VII thus aimed to enable the government to hold
employers accountable for discriminatory conduct that the individual
complaint system did not or could not reach.51 The Department of
Justice, however, did not have the resources to litigate more than a
handful of these pattern-or-practice cases in Title VII’s early years.52
Shortly after Title VII came into effect, members of Congress
began working to remedy its shortcomings.53
These efforts

45. Id. at 1253, 1255.
46. Id. at 1252.
47. Hill, supra note 35, at 31.
48. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 709(c), 78 Stat. 241, 263
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c)).
49. Hill, supra note 35, at 7–8.
50. Civil Rights Act, § 707(a). The majority whip and co-sponsor of the bill that
became Title VII, Senator Humphrey, characterized patterns or practices of
discrimination as the most reprehensible violations. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16 (1977) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 14,270 (1964));
Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 444–46
(1966). In response to concern that section 707 would impose excessive liability on
employers, he explained that the provision targeted employers that persistently
violated Title VII. 110 CONG. REC. 14,239.
51. Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1229.
52. David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment
Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1137 (1989) (explaining that the
Attorney General and Department of Justice prioritized their other responsibilities under
the Civil Rights Act, first desegregating public accommodations and schools and
enforcing voting rights laws); Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1230–32 (same).
53. Hill, supra note 35, at 33; see also Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.
318, 325 (1980) (“Congress became convinced . . . that the ‘failure to grant the
EEOC meaningful enforcement powers ha[d] proven to be a major flaw in the
operation of Title VII.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 4 (1971))); George P. Sape &
Thomas J. Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40
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culminated in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (“the
1972 Act”), which amended Title VII in several significant respects.54
First, the 1972 Act granted the EEOC authority to initiate lawsuits
against private employers based on the charges it received.55
Individual victims still had to follow the same administrative
procedures laid out in the original statute, but when the EEOC’s
conciliation efforts failed, the EEOC could sue.56 Second, the 1972
Act expanded Title VII’s coverage to include public employers and
granted the Attorney General powers to bring charge-based lawsuits
against public employers alleged to have violated Title VII.57 Third,
Congress transferred the government’s pattern-or-practice authority
from the Attorney General to the EEOC.58 After a two-year transition
period, the EEOC took over all pending pattern-or-practice cases and
the right to initiate pattern-or-practice claims.59
The provision of the 1972 Act that transferred these pattern-orpractice cases to the EEOC, however, also gave the President the
option to redistribute the government’s pattern-or-practice
functions.60 In 1978, President Jimmy Carter exercised his authority

GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 846 (1972) (observing that the legislative history of the 1972
Act is “replete” with statements regarding the need to enhance enforcement of Title
VII’s provisions).
54. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
55. Id. § 4, 86 Stat. at 104.
56. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977)
(“Although the 1972 amendments provided the EEOC with the additional
enforcement power of instituting civil actions in federal courts, Congress preserved
the EEOC’s administrative functions in § 706 of the amended Act.”). Compare Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 241, 259–61 (providing that if
conciliation failed, only the individual claimant had power to sue the employer), with
Equal Employment Opportunity Act § 4, 86 Stat. at 104 (providing that if
conciliation failed, either the individual claimant or the EEOC had authority to sue).
57. Equal Employment Opportunity Act § 2(1)–(2), 4(a), 86 Stat. at 103–06.
58. Id. § 5, 86 Stat. at 107.
59. Id.
60. Id. (“[T]he functions of the Attorney General under this section [707] shall
be transferred to the [EEOC] . . . unless the President submits, and neither House of
Congress vetoes, a reorganization plan . . . .”). The Supreme Court later held in INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), that these types of legislative vetoes were
unconstitutional. See id. at 954, 957–58 (explaining that statutory amendments must
comply with Article I’s bicameral requirement and Presentment Clauses). The
reorganization plan that the President indeed issued under this provision, see infra
text accompanying notes 61–64, is nonetheless valid because Congress subsequently
“ratifie[d] and affirm[ed] as law” all reorganization plans implemented prior to the
Court’s decision in Chadha. Pub. L. No. 98-532, § 1, 98 Stat. 2705 (1984).
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under this provision by issuing Reorganization Plan No. 1.61 The Plan
transferred the government’s power to sue public employers for
pattern-or-practice discrimination, back to the Attorney General and
left the power to sue private employers for pattern-or-practice
discrimination with the EEOC.62 Other sections of the Reorganization
Plan
consolidated
federal
enforcement
of
employment
discrimination laws in the EEOC.63 President Carter explained in his
accompanying statement to Congress that the Plan “place[d] the
Commission at the center of equal employment opportunity
enforcement” so that the agency could “give coherence and direction
to the government’s efforts” to combat employment discrimination.64
Two years later, the Supreme Court echoed President Carter’s view
that the EEOC is “the principal [f]ederal agency in fair employment
enforcement.”65 In General Telephone Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v.
EEOC,66 the Court held that the EEOC did not need to obtain class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 when seeking
relief for a group of individuals.67 The Court reasoned that in
granting the EEOC authority to sue employers in federal court,
Congress intended the agency to represent not only persons
aggrieved but also the United States and the broader public interest
in ensuring fair employment practices.68 The Court further noted
that prior to 1972, the Attorney General brought pattern-or-practice

61. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 719 (2012), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
62. See id. § 5. Specifically, the Reorganization Plan states,
Any function of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
concerning initiation of litigation with respect to State or local government,
or political subdivisions under Section 707 of Title VII . . . and all necessary
functions related thereto, including investigation, findings, notice and an
opportunity to resolve the matter without contested litigation, are hereby
transferred to the Attorney General, to be exercised by him in accordance
with procedures consistent with said Title VII.
Id.
63. Id. §§ 1–4 (transferring to the EEOC enforcement of the equal pay provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, all functions related to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, and enforcement of federal employment laws).
64. 5 U.S.C. app. at 721 (Message of the President).
65. Id. at 720.
66. 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
67. Id. at 333–34. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provides numerous
requirements for litigating class-action lawsuits, including a court order certifying
that the class meets the Rule’s requirements and defining its members and claims.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
68. Gen. Tel. Co., 446 U.S. at 325–29.
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suits in the name of the United States without obtaining certification
under Rule 23, and “[i]t is clear that with the 1972 amendments
Congress intended the EEOC to proceed in the same manner.”69
In the following decades, Congress made additional amendments
to Title VII’s procedures and definitions of unlawful employment
practices, but the statute’s overall enforcement structure has
remained consistent.70 For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
(“the 1991 Act”) provided for jury trials and compensatory and
punitive damages in certain Title VII cases.71 The 1991 Act also
codified the disparate impact theory of discrimination,72 thereby
overturning the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio.73 More recently, Congress passed the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (“the Fair Pay Act”)74 in response to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co.75 The Ledbetter Court had held that issuing a paycheck effecting a
prior discriminatory salary decision did not restart Title VII’s filing
period.76 The Fair Pay Act explicitly abrogated Ledbetter, declaring the
decision “at odds with the robust application of the civil rights laws
that Congress intended,” clarifying that each payment of wages based
on a previous unlawful employment decision constitutes a new,
actionable discriminatory act.77

69. Id. at 329.
70. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (1976) (showing Title VII as amended
by the 1972 Act), with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012) (showing the current
version of Title VII).
71. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–74.
72. Id. §§ 2–3, 105 Stat. at 1071.
73. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The Wards Cove Court had substantially constrained
plaintiffs’ ability to successfully allege disparate impact discrimination. Id. at 659–60.
Because members of Congress could not agree on the precise holding in Wards Cove, the
1991 Act simply provided that the law around disparate impact discrimination was as it
had been the day before the Court issued its opinion. See Civil Rights Act §§ 2–3, 105 Stat.
at 1071; Linda Lye, Comment, Title VII’s Tangled Tale: The Erosion and Confusion of
Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 334
(1998) (explaining that the 1991 Act was a result of two years of “contentious” debates
about how Congress should respond to the Wards Cove decision).
74. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
75. 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
76. Id. at 628, 632.
77. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act §§ 2–3, 123 Stat. at 5–6.

FAIRCHILD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

208

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/31/2016 8:15 PM

[Vol. 66:195

B. Comparing Section 706 and Section 707 of Title VII
Title VII contains two primary vehicles for enforcement: section
706 and section 707.78 These sections embody the two general types
of lawsuits created in the original statute.79 Section 706 provides for
charge-based lawsuits, which arise from charges filed with the EEOC
and focus on specific instances of discrimination.80 These cases seek
to vindicate the rights of individuals harmed by employers’ unlawful
conduct, either on an individual or class-wide basis.81 Accordingly,
both individual victims and the government—the EEOC or the
Attorney General—acting on behalf of these victims, may bring a
lawsuit under section 706.82
Section 707 provides for pattern-or-practice lawsuits, which arise
from evidence that an employer regularly discriminates against
employees or job applicants.83 These pattern-or-practice cases seek to
redress discriminatory policies and vindicate the public’s interest in
eradicating artificial barriers to equal employment opportunities.84
In contrast to section 706 suits, only the EEOC or the Attorney
General may litigate section 707 suits.85

78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5–6 (2012).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 34–40, 50–51 (explaining that the original
Title VII statute authorized individual victims of employment discrimination to sue
their employers for specific discriminatory acts, and it authorized the Attorney
General to sue employers engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; see also Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S.
355, 359 (1977) (noting that section 706 cases “begin[] when a charge is filed with the
EEOC alleging that an employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice”).
81. EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1084 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also EEOC v. Cont’l Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884, 887–
89 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that the EEOC may not sue an employer under section
706 after the individual complainant has filed a private suit against the same
employer based on the same underlying charge).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6; see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
336 (1977) (explaining that to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination under
section 707, the government must show that the alleged discrimination was the employer’s
“standard operating procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice”).
84. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326–29 (1980); Mitsubishi,
990 F. Supp. at 1076–77.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a); see also EEOC v. Nev. Resort Ass’n, 792 F.2d 882, 886
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that district courts lack jurisdiction to grant a private party’s
Rule 24(b) petition to intervene in a section 707 suit); EEOC v. Page Eng’g Co., No.
76-1439, 1978 WL 114, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 1978) (“[P]rivate parties do not have
any role to play when the EEOC brings a Section 707 ‘practice and pattern’ suit.”).
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1.

The purposes of section 707 in relation to section 706
Congress designed section 707 to address discriminatory conduct
that charge-based lawsuits do not reach.86 A victim of employment
discrimination may choose not to file a timely charge with the EEOC
or a state or local fair employment agency for numerous reasons.
Workers may not know their rights or how to invoke them.87 They
may fear retaliation from the employer.88 They may view the prospect
of success at the end of the EEOC’s administrative process as too slim
and too distant to be worth pursuing.89 Or, they may find the
enforcement procedures too complex and intimidating.90
Individual charges, moreover, cannot reliably identify all
discrimination. Because workers are less likely to pursue employment
in companies or industries that they perceive would be hostile toward
them, charges tend to report on companies and sectors where
minorities and women have already gained entry—not those from
which they have been systematically shut out.91 As a result, a
complaint-driven system of enforcement alone will not reach some of
the most entrenched and invidious discrimination.
Not only do pattern-or-practice cases help to fill these gaps, but
they have the potential to reach much larger numbers of workers
than charge-based cases.
Section 707 indeed authorizes the
government to remedy entire systems that discriminate.92 Gathering
the evidence to prove that an employer has engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination is thus extremely resource-intensive.
Pattern-or-practice cases generally involve extensive data collection
86. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51, 67–69 (explaining that Congress
created section 707 to supplement the private lawsuits authorized by section 706); see
also EEOC v. Akal Sec., Inc., No. 08-1274-JTM, 2010 WL 3791705, at *3–4 (D. Kan.
Aug. 31, 2010) (permitting discovery of information regarding an employer’s
operations in locations beyond those identified in related charges because the EEOC
brought the lawsuit under section 707, and “a Section 707 pattern and practice
action is not confined to individual grievances”).
87. Munroe, supra note 32, at 253.
88. Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1228.
89. Munroe, supra note 32, at 253–54; see also Developments in the Law, supra note
43, at 1228–29 (suggesting that black workers may doubt that their rights will be
enforced against a white employer in a predominantly white legal system).
90. Munroe, supra note 32, at 253.
91. Id. at 255 (contending that “the figures for discriminatory claims and charges
may [in fact] invert reality”); see also Ronald Turner, A Look at Title VII’s Regulatory
Regime, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 219, 236–37 (1994) (explaining that charge-based
litigation protects incumbent employees but does little to address discrimination in
the hiring process).
92. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 356–57 (1977).
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and analysis and, therefore, require greater technical expertise.93
Given their magnitude, pattern-or-practice claims also demand more
time and intra-agency coordination than individual charge-based
claims.94 Litigating one pattern-or-practice case, in fact, may preclude
the government from litigating multiple charge-based lawsuits.95
2.

The frameworks for litigating section 706 and section 707 claims
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII has helped clarify
the differences between section 706 and section 707 actions. In
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,96 the Court explained the framework
for litigating a section 706 case.97 The case arose when an AfricanAmerican man sued his former employer, alleging that the company
refused to re-hire him because of his race.98 The Court’s decision
laid out a three-step, burden-shifting framework for individuals
seeking relief under section 706.99 First, the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) the victim belonged
to a protected class, (2) the victim was subjected to an adverse
employment action, (3) the victim was qualified for the job, and (4)
93. Pauline T. Kim, Addressing Systemic Discrimination: Public Enforcement and the
Role of the EEOC, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1133, 1145 (2015).
94. Id.
95. Id. The statutory requirement that the EEOC receive and process all
allegations of employment discrimination before either the government or a private
party can take further action has constrained the agency’s ability to bring pattern-orpractice lawsuits. Id. From its inception, the EEOC has experienced a backlog of
charges and insufficient resources to process them. Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel
Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 672–90 (2005)
(chronicling the various challenges that the EEOC has faced since opening its doors
in 1965). More than 76,000 charges are currently pending resolution, and the EEOC
is facing pressure from Congress to reduce the backlog. Vin Gurrieri, Provisions to
Cut EEOC Bias Case Backlog Advance in Senate, LAW360 (Apr. 25, 2016, 3:47 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/788478/provisions-to-cut-eeoc-bias-case-backlogadvance-in-senate.
Given the resource-intensive nature of pattern-or-practice
lawsuits, EEOC officials have often declined to pursue them and instead focused on
resolving individual charges. EEOC, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT 18–19 (2006),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/upload/systemic.pdf. In the last decade,
however, the EEOC has prioritized pattern-or-practice cases in a renewed effort to
attack systemic employment discrimination. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Makes
Fight Against Systemic Discrimination a Top Priority (Apr. 4, 2006),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-4-06.cfm.
96. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
97. See id. at 798 (stating that the Court granted certiorari “to clarify the
standards governing the disposition of an action challenging employment
discrimination”).
98. Id. at 794–97.
99. Id. at 802–06.
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the employer treated similarly qualified employees or applicants
outside the protected class more favorably.100 The burden of
production then shifts to the employer “to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action.101
Finally, assuming the employer produces such a reason, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the proffered justification is merely a pretext
for discrimination and that discrimination was the employer’s actual
motive for the employment action.102 Courts may award successful
plaintiffs compensatory damages, punitive damages, and equitable
relief, such as back pay and reinstatement.103
The Court subsequently articulated a different burden-shifting
framework for litigating section 707 pattern-or-practice actions. In
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,104 the Court
explained that to prevail in a section 707 suit, the government had to
prove “more than the mere occurrence of isolated or ‘accidental’ or
sporadic discriminatory acts,” such as the refusal to hire at issue in
McDonnell Douglas.105 Rather, the government had to show “by a
preponderance of the evidence” that unlawful discrimination was
“the company’s standard operating procedure—the regular rather
than the unusual practice.”106 In Teamsters, the government sued a

100. Id. at 802 (describing a prima facie case of failure to hire based on race); 2
BLOOMBERG BNA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § II.A.2 (5th ed. 2015)
(broadening the Court’s language in McDonnell Douglas to articulate a prima facie
case of discrimination generally).
101. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 802.
102. Id. at 804–05; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143,
153–54 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1993).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2012) (providing for compensatory and punitive
damages); id. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (providing for equitable remedies). Prior to 1991,
Title VII provided only for equitable relief. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S.
279, 287 (2002) (noting that the 1991 Act expanded the remedies available under
Title VII). Finding that equitable remedies alone did not adequately deter
intentional discrimination in the workplace, Congress amended Title VII to allow
plaintiffs in section 706 cases to seek compensatory and punitive damages. Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2, 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071–72 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)).
104. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
105. Id. at 336.
106. Id. Some private class-action lawsuits have used the Teamsters framework to
litigate claims that an employer “regularly and purposefully” discriminated against a
class of employees protected by Title VII. Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing out Pattern or
Practice After Wal-Mart: The EEOC as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87, 93 (2013). Some
authors refer to these cases as “pattern or practice” suits. See, e.g., id. at 89 n.3 (using
“the term ‘private pattern or practice’ to refer to pattern or practice claims brought
by private individuals rather than a government agency such as the EEOC or U.S.
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trucking company and affiliated unions under section 707 for
systematically excluding minorities from the company’s higher-paying
and more desirable jobs.107 In determining whether the government
had presented sufficient evidence to prevail, the Court outlined the
requisite framework for bringing section 707 claims.108
Pattern-or-practice cases, the Court explained, involve two phases
of litigation—a “liability” phase and a “remedial” phase.109 In the
liability phase, the government must first present a prima facie case
that the employer engaged in a pattern or practice of
discrimination.110 The words “pattern or practice” here reflect their
usual meaning: “a pattern or practice would be present only where
the denial of rights . . . is repeated, routine, or of a generalized
nature.”111 The government can generally establish such repeated
discrimination with a combination of statistics and incident-specific
evidence.112 The burden then shifts to the employer to show that the

Department of Justice (DOJ)”); Vincent Cheng, Note, National Railroad Passenger
Corporation v. Morgan: A Problematic Formulation of the Continuing Violation Theory, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 1417, 1432–33 (2003) (describing “pattern-or-practice class action
suits” brought by named plaintiffs). Unlike the pattern-or-practice cases discussed in
this Comment, though, these “pattern-or-practice” class actions are brought by
private parties under section 706 and therefore involve different administrative
procedures and requirements. See infra Part I.B.2 (explaining the different
requirements for section 706 and section 707 cases).
107. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329–30; see also United States v. T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., Nos.
5-868, 5-897, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11509, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 1972, Dec. 6,
1973) (explaining that the company and unions routinely denied African Americans
and Spanish-surnamed Americans long-distance driving jobs, which were the most
desirable because they received higher pay and involved less physical loading and
unloading duties), vacated sub nom. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977). The Attorney General initiated this suit prior to the enactment of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which transferred the government’s
pattern-or-practice authority from the Attorney General to the EEOC. Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 328 n.1. After the 1972 Act took effect, a lower court entered an order
substituting the EEOC for the United States as plaintiff but retaining the United
States as a party “for purposes of jurisdiction, appealability, and related matters.” Id.
108. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 356–62.
109. Id. at 360–61.
110. Id. at 360.
111. Id. at 336 n.16 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 14,270 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey)).
112. Id. at 339 (explaining that the Court’s “cases make it unmistakably clear that
‘[s]tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an important role’ in
cases in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed issue,” and that victims’
testimony about their experiences bring “the cold numbers convincingly to life”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Subsequent decisions have required a
“gross statistical disparit[y],” or statistically significant difference between an
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government’s evidence is “either inaccurate or insignificant.”113 If the
employer fails to rebut the government’s evidence, the court may
find that the employer violated Title VII.114 At this point, the
government may enjoin the employer from continuing to
discriminate, order the employer to file periodic reports
documenting employment decisions going forward, and take any
other action “necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights
protected by Title VII.”115
Should the government seek relief for individual victims of the
discriminatory pattern or practice, the case proceeds to the remedial
phase.116 In this second phase, the unrebutted (or unsuccessfully
rebutted) prima facie case of discrimination “supports an inference
that any particular employment decision, during the period in which
the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that
policy.”117 The government need only show that an individual in the
relevant protected class was subject to an adverse employment action
to establish that he or she is entitled to relief.118 To avoid liability, the
employer must then demonstrate that it took the adverse
employment action against that person for lawful reasons.119 When
the employer fails to provide evidence of a lawful justification, the
court may award the individual any of the equitable remedies
available under section 706.120
Several lower courts have held that the government may use the
Teamsters framework to litigate pattern-or-practice claims under section
706.121 These courts have relied in part on the Supreme Court’s
employer’s decisions regarding the dominant class of employees and its decisions
regarding the protected class of employees. See Allan G. King, “Gross Statistical
Disparities” as Evidence of a Pattern and Practice of Discrimination: Statistical Versus Legal
Significance, 22 LAB. LAW. 271, 273–78 (2007).
113. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360; see also id. at 342 n.24 (“[A]ffirmations of good
faith . . . are insufficient to dispel a prima facie case of systematic exclusion.”).
114. Id. at 361.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 362.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. EEOC v. FAPS, Inc., No. 10-3095, 2014 WL 4798802, at *24 (D.N.J. Sept. 26,
2014). Although the 1991 Act added compensatory and punitive damages to the
remedies available in section 706 cases, supra note 103, it did not expand the relief
available in section 707 cases. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102,
105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2012)).
121. EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 826 F.3d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 2016);
Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 896 (6th Cir. 2012); EEOC v. Mavis Discount
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recognition in General Telephone that Congress gave the EEOC broad
enforcement powers to remedy employment discrimination and to
advance the public interest in equal employment opportunities.122
Indeed, by filing a pattern-or-practice case under section 706, the
government can seek compensatory and punitive damages against
employers that repeatedly discriminate against workers.123
3.

The contents of section 706 and section 707
The starkest differences between section 706 and section 707 are in
the statutory provisions themselves. Section 706 contains detailed
instructions for when and how individual claimants must file a
charge, when and how the EEOC must notify an employer of a
charge, when and how the EEOC must act on the charge, and so
on.124 Section 707, on the other hand, does not.125
a.

Section 706’s statutory requirements

Section 706 provides “an integrated, multistep enforcement
procedure” for resolving charges of discrimination.126 When an
employer unlawfully discriminates against an employee or job
applicant, either the aggrieved worker, someone acting on behalf of
the aggrieved worker, or an EEOC Commissioner must file a charge
with the EEOC or a state or local equivalent within 180 or 300 days.127
Within ten days of receiving the charge, the EEOC must serve the
employer with notice of the charge’s allegations.128 The EEOC then
must investigate the allegations to determine whether there is
reasonable cause to believe that the employer violated Title VII.129
Tire, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 90, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); EEOC v. PMT Corp., 124 F. Supp.
3d 904, 909 (D. Minn. 2015); EEOC v. Pitre, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1174
(D.N.M. 2012).
122. Bass Pro, 826 F.3d at 799–800; Serrano, 699 F.3d at 895.
123. See supra note 103 (noting that Congress provided for compensatory and
punitive damages only in section 706 cases).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
125. Id. § 2000e-6.
126. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359 (1977).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e)(1); see also supra notes 153–58 and accompanying
text (explaining section 706’s charge-filing requirements in greater detail).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14 (2016).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.15–1601.17 (detailing the
EEOC’s powers in investigating charges). Courts have construed Title VII generously
to permit the EEOC access to a broad range of employer records. EEOC v. Shell Oil
Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68–69 (1984). In its investigation, the EEOC may request “virtually
any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.” Id. The
statute provides that the EEOC shall make its reasonable cause determination “as
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If the EEOC finds reasonable cause, the agency must send the
employer a letter announcing its determination and inviting the
employer to participate in conciliation.130 The purpose of section
706’s conciliation requirement is to give employers the opportunity
to voluntarily comply with Title VII and to resolve employment
discrimination disputes out of court.131 At a minimum, the EEOC
must engage with the employer in some form of discussion designed
to afford such an opportunity.132 Yet, the EEOC has wide latitude in
determining the extent of the information it shares, the content of
the offers it extends, the pace and duration of its discussions with
employers, and the flexibility of its negotiating positions.133
If the parties cannot reach a conciliation agreement acceptable to
the EEOC, either the EEOC or the Attorney General may file a civil
complaint against the employer in federal district court.134 If the
relevant agency does not file a lawsuit, it must provide the victim(s) of
the alleged discrimination with a right-to-sue letter.135 A victim has
ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue letter to bring a private Title
VII lawsuit against the employer.136
b.

How section 706’s requirements relate to section 707 cases

Section 707—unlike section 706—contains no administrative
requirements.137 Under the original Title VII, the only prerequisite
to a section 707 lawsuit was that the Attorney General have
“reasonable cause to believe” that an employer was “engaged in a
pattern or practice” of discrimination.138 The detailed procedures
outlined in section 706 simply did not apply to section 707 cases.139
promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and
twenty days from the filing of the charge.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(a)–(b); see also Mach Mining,
LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1650, 1653 (2015) (observing that it is the EEOC’s
standard practice to issue these letters).
131. Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1651, 1655.
132. Id. at 1655–56.
133. Id. at 1654.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The EEOC may sue only private employers, and
the Attorney General may sue only public employers. Id.
135. Id. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (2016) (prescribing when and how the
EEOC must issue right-to-sue letters).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
137. Id. § 2000e-6.
138. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707, 78 Stat. 241, 261.
139. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 327 (1980) (noting that
before 1972, the Attorney General’s authority to bring pattern-or-practice cases “did
not depend upon the filing of a charge with the EEOC”); United States v. Masonry
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In 1972, Congress transferred the Attorney General’s pattern-orpractice authority to the EEOC by adding subsection 707(e): “[T]he
[EEOC] shall have authority to investigate and act on a charge of a
pattern or practice of discrimination . . . . All such actions shall be
conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 706
of this Act.”140 Six years later, when President Carter returned some
of the government’s pattern-or-practice authority to the Attorney
General, he provided that “all necessary functions” related to the
Attorney General’s new pattern-or-practice authority must be
exercised “in accordance with procedures consistent with said Title
VII.”141 These “functions” included “investigation, findings, notice
and an opportunity to resolve the matter without contested
litigation.”142 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
observed in United States v. Fresno Unified School District,143 the
Reorganization Plan “reiterates many of the § 706 procedural
prerequisites to litigation and follows from the requirement of
§ 707(e) that the EEOC was to conduct pattern or practice actions ‘in
accordance with the procedures set forth’ in § 706.”144
Courts have generally found that neither section 707(e) nor
President Carter’s Reorganization Plan added any procedural
requirements to the Attorney General’s section 707 lawsuits.145 These
courts have reasoned that because the Attorney General was not
Contractors Ass’n of Memphis, 497 F.2d 871, 875–76 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding that
because the Attorney General filed the section 707 lawsuit prior to 1972, the United
States did not need “to comply with the provisions of [section 706] as to notice,
informal methods of correction of the discriminatory acts, and the time limits for
filing a complaint”).
140. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat.
103, 107. Because the 1972 Act transferred the entirety of the government’s patternor-practice authority to the EEOC, this provision did not mention the Attorney
General. Id.
141. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 719, 720 (2012), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
142. Id.
143. 592 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1979).
144. Id. at 1095.
145. See, e.g., Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 176 F.R.D. 132, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(“It is well-established that the administrative requirements of Section 706 . . . do not
apply to cases brought by the Attorney General under Section 707.”); United States v.
City of Yonkers, 592 F. Supp. 570, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Section 707 itself prescribes
the only prerequisite to the Attorney General’s authority to bring a pattern-orpractice suit—reasonable cause.”); see also Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 592 F.2d at 1095–
96 (“The apparent intent of the Reorganization Plan is to incorporate all § 706
requirements applicable to pattern or practice suits. Not all procedures listed in
§ 706, however, are necessarily relevant in pattern or practice litigation.”).
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subject to section 706’s procedural requirements before 1972, the
Attorney General should not be subject to such requirements after
1972 absent a clear indication to the contrary.146 Moreover, these
courts have declined to read the Reorganization Plan’s instruction that
the Attorney General pursue pattern-or-practice cases “in accordance
with procedures consistent with said Title VII” as an indication that the
President intended to impose additional requirements.147
The effect of section 707(e) and the Reorganization Plan on the
EEOC’s section 707 lawsuits, however, has divided the lower federal
courts. Although courts agree that section 707(e) does require the EEOC
to follow section 706’s general administrative procedures when pursuing
section 707 cases,148 they have reached different conclusions regarding
which section 706 provisions apply to the EEOC’s section 707 cases.149
One contested provision is section 706’s charge requirement.
Some courts have read section 707(e) to mean that the EEOC can
only proceed under section 707 upon receiving a charge because the
procedures in section 706 require one.150 Other courts, however,
have focused on the absence of an explicit charge requirement in
146. See, e.g., United States v. R.I. Dep’t of Corr., 81 F. Supp. 3d 182, 189 (D.R.I.
2015) (holding that section 706’s administrative requirements do not apply to
section 707 cases filed by the Attorney General because “[n]owhere in the history
surrounding the 1972 amendments [or] Reorganization Plan No. 1 . . . does
Congress or the President make plain their intention to impose new requirements
on the Attorney General in bringing an action under Section 707(a)”).
147. See, e.g., City of Yonkers, 592 F. Supp. at 582 (rejecting an employer’s argument
that the Reorganization Plan subjected the Attorney General to the same
requirements that section 707 imposes on the EEOC); United States v. New Jersey,
473 F. Supp. 1199, 1201–02 (D.N.J. 1979) (same).
148. See, e.g., Arizona ex rel. Horne v. Geo Grp., Inc., 816 F.3d 1189, 1201 (9th Cir.
2016) (noting that the EEOC’s conciliation requirements are the same for claims arising
under sections 706 and 707); EEOC v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 809 F.3d 335, 343 (7th Cir.
2015) (stating that “Congress intended for the [EEOC] to be bound by the procedural
requirements set forth in Section 706” when litigating pattern-or-practice suits).
149. Compare Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 592 F.2d at 1095–96 (noting that not all
section 706 procedures are relevant to section 707 cases), and United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 844 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that “the
duplication” of section 706’s procedures in section 707 cases does not “extend
beyond the administrative level”), with CVS Pharmacy, 809 F.3d at 343 (suggesting that
all section 706 procedures apply to section 707 cases).
150. See, e.g., CVS Pharmacy, 809 F.3d at 343 (“The 1972 amendments gave the
EEOC the power to file ‘pattern or practice’ suits on its own, but Congress intended
for the agency to be bound by the procedural requirements set forth in Section 706,
including proceeding on the basis of a charge.”); EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 904
F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1093 (D. Haw. 2012) (“[T]he EEOC’s ability to act under § 707 is
necessarily dependent upon the existence of a properly filed charge of
discrimination . . . .”).
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section 707 and read section 707(e) to mean that the EEOC must
comply with section 706’s administrative requirements only if the
EEOC receives a charge.151
II. TITLE VII’S LIMITATIONS PERIOD
Arguably, the most litigated questions regarding the relationship
between section 706’s statutory requirements and the EEOC’s section
707 pattern-or-practice cases is whether section 706’s filing period
applies and, if so, which victims of a pattern or practice of
discrimination may obtain relief. Courts disagree over whether
Congress intended for the limitations period that determines the
timeliness of the underlying charge in section 706 cases to restrict
relief in section 707 cases.152 Section 706(e) of Title VII provides,
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and
eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred . . . except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice
with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted
proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek
relief from such practice[,] . . . such charge shall be filed by or on
behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . .153

In most cases litigated under section 706, this limitations period is
relatively straightforward. The clock starts running the day that the
employer discriminates against an employee or job applicant.154 The
employee or job applicant then has either 180 or 300 days to file a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC or a state or local
equivalent.155 In states that have their own equal employment laws and
151. EEOC v. Doherty Enters., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2015); accord
EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 35 F. Supp. 3d 836, 852 n.9 (S.D. Tex. 2014)
(“The Court does not agree with [defendant employer] that the text of the statute
requires that any suit filed pursuant to [section] 707 be preceded by a charge. . . .
[Section] 707(e) dictates what must happen when a pattern-or-practice charge is
filed, but does not mandate that such a charge be filed in the first instance.”), aff’d,
826 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2016).
152. See EEOC v. FAPS, Inc., No. 10-3095, 2014 WL 4798802, at *23–24 (D.N.J.
Sept. 26, 2014) (listing twenty district court cases filed by the EEOC under section
707 that have addressed this question—thirteen applied the section 706 limitations
period and seven did not).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2012).
154. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002), superseded in
part by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
155. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(1)–(2), (4)(ii)(A) (2016). The EEOC refers to these
state and local agencies as Fair Employment Practice Agencies (FEPAs). Fair
Employment Practice Agencies (FEPAs) and Dual Filing, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/em
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an agency to enforce them, the limitations period is 300 days.156 In all
other states, the limitations period is 180 days.157 Only charges filed
within the relevant limitations period give rise to a cause of action.158
The effect of the limitations period has been unclear in two
circumstances: (1) section 706 cases in which a person suffered
repeated discriminatory acts over a period of time that began more
than 180 or 300 days before he or she filed a charge and (2) section
707 cases. In the first category of cases, known as continuing
violations, courts must determine whether the limitations period
precludes the plaintiff from recovering for discrimination that
occurred more than 180 or 300 days before she filed her charge.159
In pattern-or-practice cases, which are based on evidence that many
individuals suffered discrimination over an extended period of time,
courts must determine whether the limitations period precludes the

ployees/fepa.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2016) [hereinafter FEPAs and Dual Filing]; see
also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(a) (explaining that for an agency to qualify as a FEPA, the
state or local subdivision must have a law prohibiting employment discrimination
and the authority to pursue relief for violations of those laws). Under Title VII,
before the EEOC steps in, it must allow states with their own equal employment
opportunity programs an opportunity to resolve charges of discrimination. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(c) (prohibiting the filing of charges with the EEOC sooner than sixty days
after the commencement of state or local proceedings, unless those proceedings end
earlier); see also Berg, supra note 40, at 67–68 (explaining that Congress had to find a
way to supplement existing state enforcement efforts without infringing on state
sovereignty or creating opportunities for forum shopping because twenty-five states
already had equal employment opportunity laws when Title VII was proposed).
Today, many FEPAs have entered into work-sharing agreements with the EEOC
whereby the state agencies waive Title VII’s requirement that the EEOC wait sixty
days before acting on a charge filed in their jurisdiction. See EEOC v. Commercial
Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115-16 (1988) (upholding one of these agreements
on the ground that a state agency’s waiver “terminates” the agency’s proceedings per
section 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)).
156. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(4).
157. § 1601.13(a)(1)–(2). The only states that do not have a FEPA are Alabama,
Arkansas, and Mississippi. See § 1601.74(a) (listing agencies in the forty-seven other
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands). Some states
with an equal employment opportunity statute and FEPA, however, may provide less
protection than Title VII. For example, a state’s laws may prohibit racial
discrimination but not sex discrimination, or they may apply to for-profit employers
but not non-profit employers. § 1601.13(2). In these states, charges relating to
discriminatory conduct not covered by state law must be filed within 180 days of the
alleged Title VII violation. Id.
158. Cf. Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. at 124–25 (holding that the EEOC could
proceed on a charge filed within the 300-day limitations period, even though the
filing date exceeded the limitations period provided under applicable state law).
159. Cheng, supra note 106, at 1419–20.
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government from obtaining relief for individuals harmed by the
pattern or practice more than 180 or 300 days before the initiating
charge.160 In other words, courts must decide whether an employer
must provide relief for the entire pattern or practice of
discrimination, or for only the portion of the pattern or practice that
fell within the limitations period.
Both of these circumstances lack a single, easily identifiable act that
would trigger the limitations period. Most continuing violations
involve a series of discriminatory acts that individually would not
violate Title VII but that collectively give rise to a cause of action.161
Similarly, a pattern or practice of discrimination involves repeated
discrimination against numerous people over an extended period of
time.162 To apply section 706’s limitations period in these cases, a
court must take the date of the charge—whether filed by an
individual claimant or by an EEOC Commissioner—and count back
180 or 300 days to determine which discriminatory acts or which
victims of discrimination are eligible for relief.163
Thus, the
limitations period functions less as a statute of limitations and more
as a “reach-back” period.164
A. Application of the Limitations Period to Continuing Violations in Section
706 Cases
The continuing violation theory is a procedural theory that courts
have adopted to modify or toll the limitations period in cases in
160. See, e.g., EEOC v. FAPS, Inc., No. 10-3095, 2014 WL 4798802, at *22 (D.N.J.
Sept. 26, 2014) (stating that the question presented in this section 707 case was
whether “the EEOC may seek relief for individuals who were denied employment
more than 300 days before the filing of the Commissioner’s Charge”).
161. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115, 117 (2002)
(discussing hostile-work-environment claims), superseded in part by statute, Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
162. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)
(explaining that to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination under section 707,
the government must show more than isolated or sporadic discriminatory conduct).
163. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa noted,
[T]here is a dual aspect to the Title VII limitations periods; they have a
retrospective, as well as a prospective, aspect. In other words, not only must
charges be filed within 180 (or 300) days after a discriminatory event, but also, as
a general rule, the aggrieved party can only achieve redress for discriminatory
acts which occurred 180 (or 300) days prior to the filing of charges.
EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 867, 871 (N.D. Iowa 2009)
(quoting 4 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 72.02 (2d ed. July 2008)).
164. Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396,
400 (1st Cir. 1990).
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which the plaintiff experienced persistent discrimination over an
extended period of time.165 By applying this theory, courts can award
relief for discriminatory acts that occurred both within and prior to
the reach-back period. In the first several decades after the
enactment of Title VII, the federal courts of appeals developed
different standards for identifying which cases of discrimination
qualified as continuing violations.166 For example, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit developed a three-factor test that looked
at whether the alleged discriminatory acts involved the same type of
Title VII violation, when and how often the acts occurred, and
whether the discrimination had reached a “degree of permanence”
that “should trigger an employee’s awareness of and duty to assert his
or her rights.”167 The Ninth Circuit, however, adopted a “sufficientrelation” test that looked at whether the alleged discriminatory acts
were sufficiently related to one another to constitute a single
violation.168 Other circuits adopted versions of these tests.169
In 2002, the Supreme Court clarified some of the ambiguity
regarding the continuing violation doctrine in National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan.170 The case involved an African-American
man, Morgan, who sued his former employer under section 706,
alleging that the company had discriminated against him by
committing a series of discriminatory acts and by maintaining a
racially hostile work environment.171 Morgan had filed a charge of
discrimination with his state’s equal employment agency, the
California Department of Fair Employment and Housing, on February
27, 1995.172 The EEOC subsequently issued him a right-to-sue letter,
and he filed a timely complaint in district court under section 706.173
Because Morgan filed the initial charge with a state agency, the

165. Thelma A. Crivens, The Continuing Violation Theory and Systemic Discrimination:
In Search of a Judicial Standard for Timely Filing, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (1988).
166. Cheng, supra note 106, at 1422–23.
167. Id. at 1422 (quoting Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 715 F.2d
971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983)).
168. Id. at 1422–23 (citing Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 936–37 (9th Cir. 1999),
abrogated by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), superseded in part
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009)).
169. Id. at 1423.
170. 536 U.S. 101 (2002), superseded in part by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
171. Id. at 104–05.
172. Id. at 105.
173. Id. at 106.
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applicable limitations period was 300 days.174
Many of the
discriminatory acts alleged in the complaint, however, occurred more
than 300 days before Morgan filed his charge.175 The issue before the
Court was “whether, and under what circumstances, a Title VII plaintiff
may file suit on events that fall outside this statutory time period.”176
Writing for the majority, former chairman of the EEOC Justice
Clarence Thomas177 looked to the language of Title VII: “A charge
under [section 706] shall be filed within [three hundred] days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”178 Morgan argued that the
term “unlawful employment practice” included an ongoing violation
that endured over a period of time and that the entirety of such a
practice was actionable as long as one or more of the acts that
comprised it “occurred” during the 300-day limitations period.179 With
respect to the discrete discriminatory acts alleged in the complaint, the
Court rejected this argument.180 The Court held that the term
“practice” did not “convert[] related discrete acts into a single unlawful
practice for the purposes of timely filing.”181 Rather, Justice Thomas
explained, “[e]ach discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for
filing charges alleging that act” such that a time-barred act is not
actionable, even if it “relate[s] to acts alleged in timely filed charges.”182
With respect to the hostile-work-environment claim, on the other
hand, the Court adopted Morgan’s argument.183
The Court
recognized that a hostile work environment inherently involves
repeated conduct and “cannot be said to occur on any particular
day.”184 The degree of harassment necessary to create a hostile work
environment develops over time, and unlike a discrete act, “a single act

174. See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text.
175. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106.
176. Id. at 105.
177. Prior to his appointment to the federal bench, Clarence Thomas was the
eighth and longest-serving Chairman of the EEOC, leading the agency’s
enforcement efforts from 1982 to 1990. Clarence Thomas, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.g
ov/eeoc/history/35th/bios/clarencethomas.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2016). For a
detailed account of Clarence Thomas’s background and his legacy at the EEOC, see
Juan Williams, A Question of Fairness, ATLANTIC (Feb. 1987), http://www.theatlantic.co
m/magazine/archive/1987/02/a-question-of-fairness/306370.
178. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000)).
179. Id. at 110.
180. Id. at 110–11.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 113.
183. Id. at 117–18.
184. Id. at 115.
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of harassment may not be actionable on its own.”185 A hostile-workenvironment claim is therefore “based on the cumulative effect of
individual acts”186 that “collectively constitute one ‘unlawful
employment practice.’”187 The Court, therefore, concluded that where
at least one act contributing to a hostile-work-environment claim
occurred within the limitations period, courts may consider “the entire
time period of the hostile environment” in determining relief.188
The decision in Morgan thus provided legal standards for two issues.
First, it helped distinguish between discrete discriminatory acts, such as
firing or not hiring someone, and continuing violations, such as
harassment or maintaining a hostile work environment. Second, it
explained how courts should apply the statutory limitations period to
discrete-act claims versus continuing-violation claims. Yet, the decision
did not address how courts should deal with the limitations period in
pattern-or-practice cases. Justice Thomas wrote in a footnote, “We
have no occasion here to consider the timely filing question with
respect to ‘pattern-or-practice’ claims . . . as none are at issue here.”189
B. Application of the Limitations Period to Pattern-or-Practice
Discrimination in Section 707 Cases
So how should courts address the timely filing question in patternor-practice suits? When does the limitations period start? Which
discriminatory act starts the statutory clock running if no single act
can constitute a “pattern or practice”? Who can recover in a patternor-practice case—all victims of the ongoing practice or only
individuals who were injured by the practice during the limitations
period? Where the government shows that an employer engaged in
an ongoing practice of discrete violations, which acts give rise to
damages—all acts that occurred while the practice was in place or
only acts that occurred during the limitations period?

185. Id. (explaining that use of an epithet, for example, does not, on its own,
“sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII” (quoting
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993))).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 117.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 115 n.9. Although footnote 9 referred specifically to private class-action
suits filed under section 706 that allege an employer systematically discriminated
against employees or job applicants, these class-action cases raise many of the same
concerns as pattern-or-practice cases litigated by the EEOC.
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District courts have answered these questions in different ways.190
Several years before the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan, the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of Illinois held in EEOC v.
Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America191 that the limitations period
provided in section 706 does not apply to section 707 actions.192 The
EEOC had sued Mitsubishi under section 707 pursuant to a
Commissioner’s charge, alleging that the car company routinely
discriminated against women through sexual harassment, retaliation,
and constructive discharge at one of its auto assembly plants.193
Mitsubishi argued that women who either left the company more than
300 days before the Commissioner’s charge or did not complain within
the 300-day window should be barred from the suit, but the court
disagreed.194 The court reasoned that “the very nature of a pattern or
practice case attacking systemic discrimination by a company seems to
preclude the application of a limitations period.”195
Five years after Morgan, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland came to a similar conclusion in EEOC v. LA Weight Loss.196
The EEOC had investigated a female employee’s charge alleging that
LA Weight Loss repeatedly failed to hire qualified male applicants
and found reasonable cause to believe that the company had
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination.197 The agency
issued a letter to LA Weight Loss, giving notice of its
determination.198 In the ensuing lawsuit, LA Weight Loss sought to
exclude all claims for male applicants who were denied a job more
than 180 days before the EEOC issued its determination letter.199
The court, agreeing with the reasoning in Mitsubishi, held that no
statutory limitations period applies in pattern-or-practice cases.200
Other district courts have drawn a line between cases brought
pursuant to a Commissioner’s charge and those initiated by an
190. See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT 09CV2573, 2010 WL 1728847, at *2 (D.
Md. Apr. 27, 2010) (discussing the split among district courts and citing eight district
court decisions—four in favor of, and four opposed to, applying the 180-day or 300day limitations period to pattern-or-practice cases).
191. 990 F. Supp. 1059 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
192. Id. at 1084.
193. Id. at 1068.
194. Id. at 1083–84.
195. Id. at 1084.
196. 509 F. Supp. 2d 527 (D. Md. 2007).
197. Id. at 531.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 534.
200. Id. at 535–36.
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individual claimant’s charge. In EEOC v. Custom Cos.,201 the EEOC
sued an employer, Custom Companies, under section 707, alleging
that the company had engaged in a pattern or practice of sexually
harassing female employees.202 The EEOC had investigated the case
after one female employee filed a charge with the agency, and it
quickly discovered that many other female employees had also been
victims of sexual harassment.203 Yet, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held that section 706’s filing period
applied to section 707 cases and that only women who had been
employed during the limitations period—300 days before the female
employee’s charge—could recover.204
The court distinguished
Mitsubishi by noting that the EEOC’s claim there was based on a
Commissioner’s charge whereas the case against Custom arose from a
private claimant’s charge.205
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, however, has
concluded more recently that the section 706 limitations period does
restrict relief in pattern-or-practice cases that are based on a
Commissioner’s charge.206 In EEOC v. FAPS, Inc.,207 the EEOC had
filed a Commissioner’s charge against FAPS and found that the
company had been engaged in a company-wide pattern or practice of
discrimination against African Americans in recruiting and hiring for
the previous three years.208 When the EEOC sued, the district court
held that only African-American applicants denied a job at FAPS
within the 300 days before the date of the Commissioner’s charge
could recover.209
All individuals who were unlawfully denied
employment before the 300-day limitations period as a result of the
same pattern or practice were out of luck.210
These cases, and numerous others, illustrate the differing opinions
among district courts regarding how the section 706 limitations
period applies to section 707 cases. Prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Morgan, at least three courts had held that section 706

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

No. 02 C 3768, 03 C 2293, 2004 WL 765891 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2004).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *7–8.
EEOC v. FAPS, Inc., No. 10-3095, 2014 WL 4798802, at *24 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2014).
No. 10-3095, 2014 WL 4798802 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2014).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *26.
Id.
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does not limit recovery in section 707 cases.211 Conversely, two other
courts had held that section 706 does limit recovery in section 707
cases.212 After Morgan, courts are still split. At least five have agreed
with the EEOC and found the limitations period inapplicable.213
Meanwhile, another twelve have sided with employers and applied
the limitations period to narrow the scope of relief.214 Following a
string of these district court decisions in 2012, two attorneys at
Seyfarth Shaw LLP published an article declaring that “the tides are
turning,” and that courts are increasingly recognizing that EEOC
pattern-or-practice suits must indeed adhere to section 706’s
limitations period.215 The following analysis, however, explains that
the Supreme Court’s decisions, Title VII’s language, and the purpose
of section 707 require a different conclusion.

211. EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1093 (C.D. Ill.
1998); EEOC v. Rymer Foods, Inc., No. 88 C 10680, 1989 WL 88243, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
July 31, 1989); EEOC v. Cont’l Oil Co., 393 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D. Colo. 1975).
212. EEOC v. Optical Cable Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 539, 547 (W.D. Va. 2001);
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1260 (M.D. Ala. 1980).
213. EEOC v. New Prime, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1217 (W.D. Mo. 2014); EEOC
v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., No. 08-CV-706, 2010 WL 86376, at *4–5 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 6,
2010); EEOC v. LA Weight Loss, 509 F. Supp. 2d 527, 535 (D. Md. 2007); EEOC v.
Scolari Warehouse Mkts., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1136 (D. Nev. 2007); EEOC v.
Dial Corp., No. 99 C 3356, 2002 WL 1974072, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2002).
214. FAPS, Inc., 2014 WL 4798802, at *26; EEOC v. Princeton Healthcare Sys., No.
10-4126, 2012 WL 5185030, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2012); EEOC v. Presrite Corp., No.
11 CV 260, 2012 WL 3780351, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2012); EEOC v. Glob.
Horizons, Inc., No. CV-11-3045-EFS, 2012 WL 3095577, at *7 (E.D. Wash. July 27,
2012); EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 10-1284, 2012 WL 3017869, at *8 (W.D. Pa. July
23, 2012); EEOC v. PBM Graphics Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 334, 368 (M.D.N.C. 2012);
EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 884 F. Supp. 2d 499, 523 (S.D. Tex. 2012), on
recons., 35 F. Supp. 3d 836 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d, 826 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2016); EEOC v.
Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d 619, 623 (N.D. Ohio 2011); EEOC v.
Bloomberg LP, 751 F. Supp. 2d 628, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT
09CV2573, 2010 WL 1728847, at *7 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2010); EEOC v. Burlington
Med. Supplies, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 647, 659 (E.D. Va. 2008); EEOC v. Custom Cos.,
Nos. 02 C 3768, 03 C 2293, 2004 WL 765891, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2004).
215. See Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. & Lily M. Strumwasser, The Tides Are Turning:
EEOC Pattern or Practice Lawsuits Must Adhere to Title VII’s 300-Day Limitation Period, 29
ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 71, 71–72 (2013) (advocating for a strict application of the
section 706 limitations period to section 707 claims as a means of “wip[ing] out large
numbers of the EEOC’s claims”). One of the authors of this article, Gerald L.
Maatman, Jr., in fact represented several of the defendants in Global Horizons. EEOC
v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1056 (D. Haw. 2014); EEOC v. Glob.
Horizons, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1080 (D. Haw. 2012).
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III. TITLE VII’S LIMITATIONS PERIOD DOES NOT RESTRICT THE CLASS
OF VICTIMS ELIGIBLE FOR RELIEF IN EEOC PATTERN-OR-PRACTICE
CASES
Applying section 706’s limitations period to restrict relief in EEOC
pattern-or-practice cases thoroughly undermines the legislative
purpose of section 707 and of Title VII as a whole. Courts must read
the individual provisions of Title VII in context.216 Indeed, nearly
every Supreme Court decision interpreting Title VII has looked to its
legislative history and overarching policy goals.217 Reading section
707 against this backdrop reveals that Congress intended section 707
to empower the government to attack entire patterns or practices of
discrimination—not 180-day or 300-day fragments of them.
A. Section 706’s Limitations Period Does Not Apply to the EEOC’s Section
707 Cases
1.

Congress designed pattern-or-practice cases to provide broad relief for
discriminatory employment practices that individual charges cannot
adequately address
Pattern-or-practice lawsuits are an integral part of Title VII’s
enforcement scheme. The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress
intended Title VII to eradicate discrimination throughout the economy
and provide victims of employment discrimination with “make[-]whole”
relief.218 Because an individual complaint system alone could not achieve

216. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416–19 (1975) (instructing
that in Title VII cases, courts must exercise their authority to award back pay “in light
of the large objectives of the Act” (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331
(1944))), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
217. See, e.g., EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115–20 (1988)
(drawing on Title VII’s legislative history to hold that a state’s waiver of its 60-day
exclusive jurisdiction over a charge “terminates” the state agency’s proceedings and
allows the EEOC to process the charge); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.
318, 325–29 (1980) (using legislative history to conclude that the EEOC may sue on
behalf of a class of workers without obtaining Rule 23 class certification); Occidental
Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361–66 (1977) (employing legislative
history in deciding that section 706’s post-charge statute of limitations does not apply to
the EEOC); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 419–21 (relying on the legislative history to
determine that Title VII requires district courts to award back pay for losses suffered);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434–36 (1971) (looking to the legislative
history in holding that Title VII requires that employment tests be job related).
218. See, e.g., Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418 (“[T]he purpose of Title VII[,] to make
persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination[,] . . . is shown by the very fact that Congress took care to arm the
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these goals, Congress empowered the federal government to attack
systemic discrimination.219 Section 707 of Title VII gave the Attorney
General, and subsequently the EEOC, the authority to sue employers that
routinely discriminated against employees and job applicants.220 As
Justice Marshall explained, “employment discrimination was a ‘complex
and pervasive’ problem that could be extirpated only with
thoroughgoing remedies.”221 Indeed, “‘[u]nrelenting broad-scale
action against patterns or practices of discrimination’ was essential” to
achieve the purposes of Title VII.222 Using the section 706 limitations
period to drastically restrict the scale of the EEOC’s pattern-orpractice cases contravenes Congress’s intent.
Congress also designed pattern-or-practice cases to provide “swift
and effective” relief.223 Title VII even provides that when the
government files a section 707 suit in federal court, the chief judge of
the district and the judge assigned to the case “shall . . . cause the case to
be in every way expedited.”224 During the debates preceding the 1972
Act, Senator Gurney explained that because a pattern or practice of
discrimination affects large numbers of workers, the statute must afford
“the most expeditious and readily enforceable relief available.”225
Section 707’s provisions for expedited relief thus indicate that Congress
intended to prioritize section 707 cases above suits based on discrete
acts. To conclude that Congress also intended to truncate relief in these
707 cases based on a limitations period designed to encourage
individual complainants to file timely charges would be nonsensical.
Although some courts have reasoned that Congress’s primary
intent in creating section 707 was not to remedy past discrimination
but to stop future discrimination, the Supreme Court has rejected such
a distinction. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,226 the Court explained
that “nothing on the face of [Title VII] or in its legislative history . . .
justifies the creation of drastic and categorical distinctions between

courts with full equitable powers. For it is the historic purpose of equity to ‘secur[e]
complete justice.’” (citation omitted)).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 34–51 (recounting the historical
development of the EEOC’s enforcement power under Title VII).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 34–51.
221. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 69 (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-238,
at 8 (1971)).
222. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 14 (1971)).
223. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 843 (5th Cir. 1975).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(b) (2012).
225. 118 CONG. REC. 4077–78 (1972).
226. 422 U.S. 405 (1975), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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[prospective and retrospective] remedies.”227 Examining Title VII’s
legislative history, the Court found that in cases of employment
discrimination, courts have “not merely the power but the duty” to
“eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future.”228 Yet, the district court in Custom Cos.
asserted that denying relief to employees who were employed outside
the filing period “would do little to frustrate the primary public purpose
of the EEOC’s enforcement action” because the EEOC could still halt
the employer’s pattern or practice of discrimination through injunctive
remedies.229 To the extent that the Custom court and other district
courts have applied the section 706 limitations period to section 707
claims based on this reasoning, their decisions are simply wrong.
Section 707 empowers the government to seek, and federal courts to
grant,230 make-whole relief to victims of systemic discrimination.
Moreover, Congress vested courts with the power to award swift
relief not only to help victims but to hold offending employers fully
accountable for their unlawful conduct. The Court explained in
Albemarle that “[i]f employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive
order, they would have little incentive to shun practices of dubious
legality.”231 Affirmative relief, such as back pay, “provide[s] the spur
or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to
self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to
eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and
ignominious page in this country’s history.”232
2.

Congress intended the EEOC to have the same authority as the Attorney
General when litigating section 707 lawsuits
When Congress transferred the government’s pattern-or-practice
authority from the Attorney General to the EEOC in the 1972 Act, it
sought to increase the effectiveness of pattern-or-practice suits, not
hamper them. The House Committee on Education and Labor

227. Id. at 423.
228. Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
229. EEOC v. Custom Cos., Nos. 02 C 3768, 03 C 2293, 2004 WL 765891, at *11
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2004).
230. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44–45 (1974) (concluding
that Congress assigned federal courts “plenary powers to secure compliance with
Title VII”).
231. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 417.
232. Id. at 417–18 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus.,
479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
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explained that the prevalence of institutionalized discrimination
required stronger Title VII enforcement:
Unfortunately, the size of the [Civil Rights] Division has not kept
pace with its vastly increased responsibilities. As a consequence[,]
the Division has been highly selective and very limited in the
number and the nature of [section 707] suits which it has filed. It
has been unable to pursue [T]itle VII suits with the vigor and
intensity needed to reduce the wide-spread prevalence of systemic
discrimination. . . . The Committee believes these [pattern-orpractice] powers should be exercised by the [EEOC] as an integral
and coordinated part of the overall enforcement effort.233

The Committee further recognized that the EEOC is in the best position
to pursue pattern-or-practice claims because it can easily access up-todate statistical information and analyses of employment trends.234
There is no evidence that Congress intended to limit the scope of
relief that the government could secure in section 707 cases. Prior to
1972, the Department of Justice filed around seventy Title VII
pattern-or-practice suits.235 None of the courts adjudicating these
cases applied the section 706 limitations period to the government’s
claims.236 When the Senate debated transferring the Attorney
General’s pattern-or-practice authority to the EEOC, representatives
consistently stated that the EEOC would have the same power under
section 707 that the Attorney General originally possessed. One of
the key proponents of the 1972 Act, Senator Williams, asserted,
“[t]here will be no difference between the cases that the Attorney
General can bring under section 707 as a ‘pattern or practice’ charge
and those which the [EEOC] will be able to bring.”237 Senator Javits,

233. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 2149 (1971).
234. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 69 (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 14).
235. 118 CONG. REC. 4079 (1972).
236. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 666 (2d Cir.
1971) (modifying an order in a pattern-or-practice case to grant relief to all
employees against whom the employer had discriminated); United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 546–48 (9th Cir. 1971) (affirming an order
awarding specific relief in a pattern-or-practice case to all African Americans to
whom various local trade unions had unlawfully denied job opportunities); United
States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Int'l Union, Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429, 441-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding in a pattern-or-practice case that all African-American
workers against whom a union had discriminated were entitled to back pay); United
States v. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, CLC, 301 F.
Supp. 906, 919–20 (E.D. La. 1969) (awarding relief in a pattern-or-practice case to all
African-American workers against whom a union and employer had discriminated).
237. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 328 (1980) (alterations in
original) (emphasis added) (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 4081).
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another sponsor of the bill, insisted the EEOC would have “the
authority to institute exactly the same actions that the Department of
Justice does under pattern or practice.”238
The only aspect of section 707 that either house debated was
whether pattern-or-practice enforcement should be left to the
Attorney General or vested in the EEOC.239 The 1972 Act’s legislative
history contains virtually no discussion of section 707(e)’s
requirement that the EEOC “investigate and act on a charge of a
pattern or practice of discrimination . . . in accordance with the
procedures set forth in [section 706].”240 A section-by-section analysis
of the bill proposed by the House Committee on Education and
Labor merely states that the provision “[a]ssimilates procedures for
new proceedings brought under Section 707 to those now provided
for under Section 706 so that the [EEOC] may provide an
administrative procedure to be the counterpart of the present
Section 707 action.”241 This explanation further suggests that
Congress viewed section 707(e) simply to say that the EEOC should
follow the same procedures that the Attorney General previously
followed in litigating pattern-or-practice cases. The section-by-section
analysis of the final bill, prepared by two senators who participated in
the conference committee, does not even mention section 707(e).242
Congress’s ultimate decision to grant the EEOC pattern-or-practice
authority turned on its recognition that the EEOC should be the
principal representative of the federal government in combating
employment discrimination. The EEOC was more insulated from
politics than the Attorney General because Commissioners were
appointed for staggered five-year terms and could not be removed at
the will of the President.243 Senator Williams explained to his fellow
Congressmen that “[t]he transfer to the [EEOC] will enable it to
operate in a fresh atmosphere within an agency that has equal
employment opportunity as its sole priority.”244 President Carter
238. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 4081).
239. 118 CONG. REC. 4076–81.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (2012).
241. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 29 (1971).
242. See 118 CONG. REC. 7166–68 (noting that the amendments to section 707
transferred pattern-or-practice jurisdiction to the EEOC, provided for concurrent
jurisdiction for two years from the date of enactment, and authorized the President
to alter this arrangement by submitting a reorganization plan).
243. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705(a), 78 Stat. 241, 258. Title
VII contains the same provisions for the appointment and removal of EEOC
Commissioners today. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a).
244. 118 CONG. REC. 294–96.
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echoed this belief when he brought the enforcement of other equal
employment opportunity statutes under the umbrella of the EEOC in
Reorganization Plan No. 1.245
Early pattern-or-practice cases also support this interpretation of
the 1972 amendments to Title VII. For example, the trial court in
Teamsters—the seminal Supreme Court pattern-or-practice case—
awarded relief to numerous minority workers who had applied for
and been denied jobs as long-distance drivers more than ten years before
the government began pursuing the case.246 The Supreme Court
found that the defendant employer and unions had perpetrated a
pattern or practice of discrimination against racial minorities in
hiring from 1958 to 1969.247 Accordingly, any minority worker who
applied to be a long-distance driver during that time was eligible for
relief in the remedial stage.248 Neither the district court, the court of
appeals, nor the Supreme Court mentioned the section 706
limitations period. Teamsters thus demonstrates that the very point of
section 707 pattern-or-practice cases was to permit the government to
remedy and make whole victims of longstanding, systemic
discrimination—an objective plainly defeated had the very short
limitations period in section 706 been applied.
3.

Section 707(e) is silent regarding section 706’s limitations period
The district courts that have applied the section 706 limitations
period in EEOC pattern-or-practice cases have reasoned that section
707(e)’s plain language incorporates section 706’s timely filing
requirement.249 A textual analysis of section 707(e), however, reveals
245. See supra text accompanying notes 61–64 (explaining the Reorganization Plan
and why it was necessary).
246. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 330–32 (1977); cf. id. at
356–57 (holding that those individuals who were denied jobs could receive a
retroactive seniority date no earlier than the effective date of Title VII).
247. Id. at 337; see EEOC v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Freight, Inc., 659 F.2d 690, 692 (5th Cir.
1981) (per curiam) (stating on remand that “[i]t is undisputed that it was the
company’s policy, from 1958 until 1969, not to allow transfer from city to line jobs”).
248. See United States v. T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., Nos. 5-868, 5-897, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11509, at app. B (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 1972, Dec. 6, 1973) (listing the names and races
of thirty workers who “the evidence clearly show[ed] were the objects of [the pattern
or practice of] discrimination” perpetrated by T.I.M.E.-D.C., the date and nature of
the adverse employment action that each worker experienced, and the relief the
court awarded), vacated sub nom., Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324.
249. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d 619, 623 (N.D.
Ohio 2011) (“The plain language of § 707(e) . . . mandates that . . . the EEOC may
only act where a charge of discrimination has been filed, and such charges must be
filed within 300 days of the unlawful employment practice.”); EEOC v. Burlington
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that its meaning is not so clear and that Title VII as written simply
does not prescribe a limitations period for section 707 cases. Section
707(e) reads, in its entirety,
Subsequent to March 24, 1972, the [EEOC] shall have authority to
investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of
discrimination, whether filed by or on behalf of a person claiming
to be aggrieved or by a member of the [EEOC]. All such actions
shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in
[section 706].250

Here, “[a]ll such actions” refers to the EEOC’s “authority to
investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of
discrimination.”251 In other words, “[a]ll such actions” refers to the
administrative processes that the EEOC follows after a charge has
been filed. Some courts have indeed concluded that the EEOC does
not even need a charge to pursue a pattern-or-practice claim under
section 707.252 Thus, the administrative processes that the EEOC
must conduct “in accordance with the procedures set forth in”
section 706 do not include a limitations period governing how a
complainant files the charge itself.
Several federal courts of appeals have agreed. In United States v.
Masonry Contractors Ass’n of Memphis,253 a pattern-or-practice case, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit simply stated, “There is no
statute of limitations delineated in [section 707], and the time
limitations for making a claim under [section 706] are not applicable
to actions under [section 707].”254 In United States v. Fresno Unified
School District,255 the Ninth Circuit remarked that “[s]ome of the § 706
procedural requirements seem to apply only to individual unlawful
employment practices and not to pattern or practice suits,” and the

Med. Supplies, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 647, 659 (E.D. Va. 2008) (“Accepting the
EEOC’s argument would contravene the text of the statute . . . .”); EEOC v. Custom
Cos., Nos. 02 C 3768, 03 C 2293, 2004 WL 765891, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2004) (“The
plain language of the Title VII statute dictates that Section 706’s 300-day filing period
applies to Section 707 actions . . . .”); EEOC v. Optical Cable Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d
539, 546 (W.D. Va. 2001) (“[A] literal reading of the text would indicate that pattern
or practice suits brought under [section 707(e)] ‘shall be conducted in accordance
with the’ 180-day limitations period set out in [section 706(e)].”).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (2012).
251. Id.
252. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
253. 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974).
254. Id. at 877.
255. 592 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1979).
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court pointed to the limitations period as an example.256 Because
section 707 “contains no requirement that anyone file a charge,” and
“it takes more than one unlawful practice to constitute a ‘pattern or
practice’ of employment discrimination,” the court explained, “there
could be no certain date from which the 180-day [limitations] period
would run.”257 Similarly, in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries,
Inc.,258 the Fifth Circuit recognized that section 707(e) incorporates
only section 706’s administrative procedures.259 Reading section
707(e) in light of the 1972 Act’s legislative history, the court
acknowledged that “Congress apparently intended that the EEOC
have investigative and conciliatory authority in ‘pattern or practice’
situations comparable to its existing powers in § 706 cases.”260 But,
the court found “no indication that Congress intended the duplication
of procedures to extend beyond the administrative level.”261 In short,
although no circuit court has directly ruled on whether the section
706 limitations period applies in section 707 cases, at least three
circuit courts have recognized that the language of section 707(e)
does not expressly incorporate it.
4.

Congress provided limitations on damages elsewhere in Title VII
Title VII’s back-pay provision provides another clue that Congress
did not contemplate applying the section 706 limitations period to
section 707 cases. Leading up to the 1972 Act, the House of
Representatives debated two equal employment opportunity bills:
one, sponsored by Representative Erlenborn, proposed a time limit
on employers’ liability for back pay in section 707 cases while the
other, sponsored by Representative Hawkins, did not.262
In
describing his bill, Erlenborn stated,
[T]o preclude the threat of enormous back[-]pay liability . . . my
bill offers a new subsection (h) of section 706 . . . which limits
liability in pattern and practice suits to a period of 2 years prior to
the filing of a complaint with said court. With respect to individual
complainants therefore, back pay and other liability is limited to
the statutory period for filing . . . . The final sentence in subsection
(h) which limits back[-]pay orders to 2 years is directed to the

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 1096 n.5.
Id.
517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id.
117 CONG. REC. 31,962 (1971); Sape & Hart, supra note 53, at 836, 838.
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pattern and practice suits authorized under section 707. It is only
fair to say that liability should not go back ad infinitum but that
there should be some reasonable statute of limitations.263

The House passed Erlenborn’s bill the following day.264 Although
Erlenborn did not explicitly state why a provision limiting back pay in
section 707 cases—but not section 706 cases—was necessary, his
comments suggest that the answer lies in “the statutory period for
filing.”265 Erlenborn’s bill presumed that section 706’s filing period
limited all forms of liability in section 706 cases. Indeed, Erlenborn
stated that in cases based on individual charges, the filing period
functions as a limit on liability.266 If section 706’s limitations period
applied to section 707 cases, it should have limited liability in section 707
cases as well.
Yet, Erlenborn, and apparently the other 199
representatives who voted to adopt the Erlenborn bill over the Hawkins
bill, was concerned about “the threat of enormous back[-]pay liability”
absent “some reasonable statute of limitations.”267 Had the House
viewed section 706’s limitations period as a limit on liability in section
707 cases, Erlenborn’s comments would have been unnecessary.
Accordingly, the House’s decision to include a provision limiting back
pay specifically in section 707 cases indicates that the House did not
think section 706’s limitations period would apply to them.
The Senate later passed its own equal employment opportunity bill,
which limited back pay to two years before the filing of the relevant
charge in both section 706 and section 707 cases, and Congress
enacted the Senate’s version.268 But, this too indicates that section
706’s limitations period does not apply to section 707 cases.
Although members of the House initially viewed the filing period as a

263. 117 CONG. REC. 31,981.
264. See id. (noting that Rep. Erlenborn made these remarks on September 15,
1971); id. at 32,111–13 (recording that the House adopted Erlenborn’s bill on
September 16, 1971).
265. Id. at 31,981.
266. Id.
267. See id. (arguing that plaintiffs could use such extensive liability to coerce
employers into giving up their due-process rights); id. at 32,111 (showing the House
agreed to adopt the Erlenborn bill in place of the Hawkins bill by a vote of 200 to
195, with thirty-nine representatives not voting).
268. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 420 n.13 (1975) (explaining
that the Senate rejected the Erlenborn bill and adopted a more liberal limit on back
pay), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); United States v. Ga. Power Co., 474
F.2d 906, 919–20 (5th Cir. 1973) (concluding that the back-pay provision in section
706(g) applies to pattern-or-practice cases brought by the EEOC or the Attorney
General under section 707).
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limitation on liability in section 706 cases, both chambers ultimately
agreed that Title VII needed a separate cap on back pay, distinct from
the filing period.269 Subsequent Congresses have also adopted this
view. For example, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act added a provision
to Title VII that expressly stated victims of pay discrimination are
entitled to the full two years of back pay available under the 1972
Act.270 In a section-by-section analysis of the proposed bill, the House
Committee on Education and Labor explained that this provision was
intended to ensure that courts did not limit back pay “to 180 [or 300]
days.”271 The Committee further emphasized that “[t]he statute of
limitations period and the back[-]pay recovery period are two
separate periods.”272
Had Congress intended section 706’s limitations period to apply to
section 707 cases and thereby cut off relief for acts that occurred
prior to that limitations period, Title VII’s back-pay provision would
be meaningless.273 Application of the limitations period to section
707 cases involving discrete discriminatory acts invariably limits
employers’ liability to acts that occurred within 180 or 300 days prior
to the relevant charge.274 In Global Horizons, for example, the court
held that the farm labor contracting firm was liable only for
discriminating against those workers employed during the 300-day
filing period.275 But, Title VII’s back-pay provision caps liability at two
years—not 300 days.
In Morgan, the Supreme Court distinguished between the function
of the filing period and the function of other Title VII provisions
relating to liability and damages.276 Justice Thomas explained that
section 706(e) is a “timeliness requirement” that specifies when a
269. See Gilmore v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, No. 06-3020, 2009 WL 305045, at *3
(D.N.J. Feb. 4, 2009) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 110-237, at 19 (2007)) (indicating that the
House intended the back-pay recovery period to be distinct from the filing period).
270. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6.
271. Gilmore, 2009 WL 305045, at *3 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 110-237, at 19 (2007)).
272. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 110-237, at 19).
273. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 119 (2002) (noting
that limiting liability to conduct that occurred during the filing period would
contradict Congress’s intent to cap back-pay recovery at two years), superseded in part
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 152–63 (analyzing section 706’s limitation
period and its effects).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 2–10, 21–23 (noting that because the court
applied the section 706 limitations period, only eighty-two Thai workers were
awarded compensation).
276. 536 U.S. at 119.
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charge is timely filed—“[i]t is but one in a series of provisions
requiring that the parties take action within specified time periods,
. . . none of which function as specific limitations on damages.”277 Indeed,
the Court pointed out that Title VII explicitly limits damages in other
provisions, such as the back-pay provision in section 706(g)(1).278 “If
Congress intended to limit liability to conduct occurring in the
period within which the party must file the charge, it seems unlikely
that Congress would have allowed recovery for two years of
backpay.”279 Rather, the explicit limitations on the amount of
recoverable damages elsewhere in Title VII show that the filing
period was not intended to limit damages.280 The Court thus
concluded that the only reason section 706(e) limits liability under
section 707(e) is because a claim must be timely to be actionable.281
5. Reading section 707(e) to incorporate section 706’s limitations period would
arbitrarily preclude victims from obtaining relief in pattern-or-practice cases
Not only does the application of Title VII’s limitations period to
pattern-or-practice cases lack support in the statute’s history, policy
goals, and text, but it also produces arbitrary and unjustifiable
outcomes. Section 706’s limitations period specifies a prerequisite
for litigating a section 706 claim282: once a person experiences
unlawful discrimination, he or she has 180 or 300 days to file a
charge; otherwise, that person loses the right to sue the employer for
that particular discriminatory act.283 This type of provision is
appropriate for charge-based lawsuits, in which a single
discriminatory act gives rise to a cause of action.
Pattern-or-practice suits, however, are not based on a particular
discriminatory act, or even discrimination experienced by a particular
person.284 To prevail on a pattern-or-practice claim, the government
must establish that discrimination was the employer’s “standard
operating procedure.”285 The nature of a pattern or practice of

277. Id. at 119–20 (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 119.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 120.
282. Id. at 109 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 153–58.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 78–91 (describing the nature and purpose
of pattern-or-practice claims).
285. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (emphasis
added).
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discrimination thus involves repeated discriminatory conduct that
develops over time and likely persists over more than 180 or 300 days.
Whereas a discrete act occurs on a particular date, a pattern or
practice takes time to unfold. There is simply no identifiable point at
which a series of discriminatory employment actions becomes an
employer’s standard operating procedure. Thus, whatever date a
court uses to calculate a limitations period in a section 707 case will
necessarily be arbitrary.
Because section 707 cases lack a date on which the pattern or
practice began, the courts that have applied the section 706
limitations period have had to calculate the limitations period based
on some other date. Most often this date was the date on which
either an EEOC Commissioner or an aggrieved worker filed a
charge.286 The courts then reached back 180 or 300 days from that
charge to determine which segment of the pattern or practice of
discrimination the EEOC could seek to remedy.287
This 180-day or 300-day segment, however, does not correlate with
when the pattern or practice of discrimination “occurred.” In other
words, if section 707(e) incorporated the section 706 limitations
period into section 707 cases, the determination of which victims
could recover and which victims could not would depend upon
factors irrelevant to an employer’s conduct, such as when the EEOC
chose to file a Commissioner’s charge, the state in which the victim
worked, and whether the employer was a public or private entity.
First, applying the limitations period to section 707 cases that arise
from a Commissioner’s charge would arbitrarily restrict relief based
on when the EEOC gathered the information necessary to file that
charge. Many pattern-or-practice cases arise from charges filed by
members of the EEOC288 because, unlike private parties, the EEOC
286. See, e.g., EEOC v. FAPS, Inc., No. 10-3095, 2014 WL 4798802, at *22, *24
(D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2014) (using the date on which an EEOC Commissioner filed a
charge to calculate the limitations period); EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 904 F. Supp.
2d 1074, 1094 (D. Haw. 2012) (using the date on which an aggrieved worker filed a
charge to calculate the limitations period); EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT 09CV2573,
2010 WL 1728847, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2010) (same); EEOC v. Custom Cos., Nos.
02 C 3768, 03 C 2293, 2004 WL 765891, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2004) (same).
287. FAPS, 2014 WL 4798802, at *24; Glob. Horizons, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 1094;
Freeman, 2010 WL 1728847, at *3; Custom Cos., 2004 WL 765891, at *8.
288. See, e.g., EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 826 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir.
2016) (discussing a pattern-or-practice case that arose from a Commissioner’s
charge); EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002)
(same); EEOC v. Dean Witter Co., 643 F.2d 1334, 1335 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); FAPS,
2014 WL 4798802, at *1 (same); EEOC v. Presrite Corp., No. 11 CV 260, 2012 WL
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has access to detailed reports of companies’ employment practices
and the demographics of relevant labor markets.289 This information
allows the EEOC to discern systemic discrimination that individual
employees and job applicants simply cannot see.290 But, the EEOC
can hardly detect a pattern of discrimination in 180 or 300 days.
Accordingly, applying the limitations period to the EEOC’s section
707 suits will unfairly cut off relief for victims who experienced
discrimination more than 180 or 300 days before the EEOC
identified the pattern or practice.
Moreover, given the resource-intensive nature of pattern-orpractice suits,291 the EEOC’s capacity to research a pattern or practice
of discrimination and gather sufficient information to file a charge
likely varies over time.292 The agency may be precluded from looking
into a particular pattern or practice violation because the staff that
specializes in such cases is already busy pursuing other section 707
suits. Accordingly, different victims would be eligible to recover
depending on the EEOC’s available resources at the time they
experienced the discrimination.
Second, applying the limitations period in section 707 cases would
also narrow or expand the class of victims eligible for relief
depending on the state in which the employer implemented the
pattern or practice of discrimination. Section 706 provides that Title
VII claimants in a state with its own fair employment agency have 300
days after an incident of discrimination to file their charges, and
claimants in a state without an agency have 180 days to file their
charges.293 As the Court in Morgan explained, the purpose of
providing additional time to complainants in states with their own
fair employment agencies is to give states the opportunity to redress
the alleged discrimination without federal intervention—the purpose
is not to restrict plaintiffs’ recovery.294

3780351, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2012) (same); EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of
Am., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1082 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (same); see also EEOC v. Shell Oil Co.,
466 U.S. 54, 84 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that Commissioners usually file charges on the basis of a pattern or practice
of discrimination).
289. Occhialino & Vail, supra note 95, at 707 & n.284.
290. Id.
291. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
293. Supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
294. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 119–20 (2002), superseded
in part by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
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The Morgan Court observed that if the reach-back period served to
limit liability in a hostile-work-environment claim, the relief available
to a victim would vary depending on where he or she filed the
discrimination charge.295 The same analysis applies to pattern-orpractice cases. For example, a person in California who suffered from
a pattern or practice of discrimination for one year prior to the filing
date could recover damages for 300 days of that year, while a person in
Mississippi with the same circumstances could recover damages for
only 180 days of that year.296 Because applying the limitations period
would tie the window of liability to the existence of a state or local fair
employment agency, such an interpretation of the statute would be
“arbitrary and inconsistent with Congressional intent.”297
Third, applying the limitations period to section 707 cases would
arbitrarily restrict the damages available to an individual harmed by
his or her employer’s pattern or practice of discrimination
depending on whether the employer was a public or private entity.
Pattern-or-practice lawsuits brought by the Attorney General against
public employers are not subject to the section 706 limitations
period.298 Thus, the government can sue public employers for the
entire duration of the discriminatory pattern or practice. If Title VII
limited the EEOC’s ability to secure relief for victims in its pattern-orpractice lawsuits, the government could only sue private employers
for discriminatory acts during a 180-day or 300-day window. Nothing
in the legislative history of the 1972 Act, however, indicates that
Congress intended this inconsistent outcome.299
Section 707’s history in fact conflicts with such an interpretation.
From 1964 to 1972, the Attorney General had sole authority to sue
private employers engaged in patterns or practices of discrimination.300
Between 1972 and 1974, the Attorney General and the EEOC had

295. Id.
296. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2012) (setting the period as 180 days for states
without equal employment agencies and 300 days for states with their own agencies).
California has an agency, but Mississippi does not. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74(a) (2016).
297. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 120.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 145–47 (explaining that courts have
generally interpreted Title VII and President Carter’s 1978 Reorganization Plan to
allow the Attorney General to pursue pattern-or-practice cases free from section
706’s administrative requirements).
299. See supra notes 273–75 and accompanying text (emphasizing that Congress
passed the 1972 Act to enhance the effectiveness of pattern-or-practice cases).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 34–40, 47–50 (describing the evolution of
Title VII and its enforcement mechanisms).

FAIRCHILD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

MAKE-WHOLE OR MAKE-SHORT?

10/31/2016 8:15 PM

241

concurrent authority to sue both private and public employers.301 From
1974, when the EEOC fully assumed enforcement of Title VII, to
President Carter’s Reorganization Plan in 1978, the EEOC had sole
authority to sue both private and public employers.302 Finally, since
1978, the EEOC has had authority to sue private employers, and the
Attorney General has had authority to sue public employers.303
To read section 707(e) to mean that Congress intended to restrict
relief in cases filed by the EEOC but not those filed by the Attorney
General would require the following additional conclusions: First,
Congress must have intended that from 1964 to 1972, private
employers found to have engaged in a pattern or practice of
discrimination would be required to provide relief to all victims, but
that starting in 1972, when Congress was attempting to ramp up Title
VII enforcement, those employers would be required to provide relief
only to a fraction of the victims—those who experienced
discrimination during the 180 or 300 days prior to the charge.
Second, because Congress supported President Carter’s decision to
transfer the authority to litigate pattern-or-practice cases against
public employers from the EEOC back to the Attorney General,
Congress apparently supported subjecting public employers to
significantly greater damages than private employers engaged in the
same conduct, even though Title VII was initially intended to apply
only to private employers. These conclusions defy both logic and the
legislative record of the 1972 Act. In particular, given the special
solicitude that state actors enjoy in the U.S. federal system, Congress
surely would not have wanted to expose state actors to greater liability
than private actors.
B. A Pattern or Practice of Discrimination Is a Continuing Violation Under
Morgan
Even if section 706’s limitations period did apply to the EEOC’s
section 707 cases, it would not restrict the scope of relief the EEOC
could secure on behalf of victims because a pattern or practice of
discrimination is the very definition of a continuing violation.
Although the Morgan Court did not address the timely filing question

301. Occhialino & Vail, supra note 95, at 679.
302. Id.
303. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 5, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. at 719 (2012), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
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for pattern-or-practice claims,304 much of its reasoning regarding
hostile-work-environment discrimination applies to pattern-orpractice suits because both pattern-or-practice claims and hostilework-environment claims constitute continuing violations. The Court
explained in Teamsters that to prove a pattern or practice of
discrimination, the government must show “more than the mere
occurrence of isolated . . . or sporadic discriminatory acts.”305 Like a
hostile work environment, a pattern or practice of discrimination
inherently involves repeated conduct and “cannot be said to occur on
any particular day.”306 Indeed, the government can bring a patternor-practice lawsuit without ever receiving allegations that an employer
committed a discriminatory act in violation of Title VII.307 The EEOC
can instead file its own charge based on the statistics it gathers.308
When the government brings a pattern-or-practice case, the very
point is that it is accusing an employer not of discrete discriminatory
acts but of a discriminatory policy or “standard operating
procedure.”309 Accordingly, like the many acts that constitute a
hostile work environment, individual acts committed pursuant to a
discriminatory policy “collectively constitute one ‘unlawful
employment practice.’”310 The Court in Morgan held that where one
act contributing to a hostile-work-environment claim occurred within
the filing period, courts may grant relief for the full duration of the
hostile environment.311 By extension then, as long as a pattern or
practice of discrimination was in effect during the filing period,
courts should consider the entire period of the discriminatory policy
when assigning liability.
Defendant employers argue that applying the limitations period in
this way would unfairly expose them to liability for stale claims.312 In

304. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 n.9 (2002), superseded
in part by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
305. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
306. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.
307. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 84 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the EEOC can pursue a pattern-orpractice case based solely on employment statistics).
308. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (2012); Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 84 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
309. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.
310. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117.
311. Id.
312. Response Brief for Appellee at 53–57, EEOC v. Freeman, 778 F.3d 463 (4th
Cir. 2015) (No. 13-2365), 2014 WL 1313604; Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint at 8–10,
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FAPS, the court agreed with this argument, stating that the timely
charge requirement, like any limitations period, provides “repose” for
employers.313 Many commentators also point out that employers may
not have the documents to refute claims relating to events that
occurred several years in the past.314 But, as the Court in Morgan
explained, allowing victims to recover for the entirety of a continuing
violation “does not leave employers defenseless against . . . claims that
extend over long periods of time.”315 The section 706 limitations
period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.316 Accordingly,
equitable doctrines, such as laches, estoppel, and waiver, are available
to protect employers where unavailability of witnesses or other
evidence in fact poses an unfair prejudice.317
CONCLUSION
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
eradicate discrimination throughout the economy and make persons
whole for injuries suffered through employment discrimination. Yet,
the current disparities in unemployment rates, wages, and
representation in professional and leadership positions across race and
gender show that we are still far from reaching this goal.318 Pattern-orEEOC v. GMRI, Inc., No. MJG-13-2860, 2014 WL 3850030 (D. Md. Aug. 4, 2014),
2013 WL 10620236; Defendant’s Reply in Further Support of its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 3–4, EEOC v. Princeton Healthcare Sys., No. 10-4126, 2012
WL 5185030 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2012), 2012 WL 11789205; Defendant’s Reply Brief in
Further Support of its Motion to Dismiss at 7–9, EEOC v. PBM Graphics, Inc., 877 F.
Supp. 2d 334 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (1:11-CV-805), 2012 WL 10027999; Memorandum of
Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Time-Barred
Claims at 3–6, EEOC v. Bloomberg LP, 751 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 07
Civ. 8383), 2010 WL 1701955; Defendants’ Motion to Limit the Class at 5–7, EEOC v.
Custom Cos., Nos. 02 C 3768, 03 C 2293, 2004 WL 765891 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2004),
2003 WL 23683303.
313. EEOC v. FAPS, Inc., No. 10-3095, 2014 WL 4798802, at *24 (D.N.J. Sept. 26,
2014) (alteration in original) (quoting EEOC v. Bloomberg LP, 751 F. Supp. 2d 628,
645 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
314. See, e.g., Maatman & Strumwasser, supra note 215, at 84 (arguing that a
charge-filing period would ensure that the EEOC files lawsuits while the relevant
evidence is still discoverable).
315. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121.
316. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982).
317. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121.
318. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NO. 1057, LABOR FORCE
CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE & ETHNICITY, 2014 4 chart 3 (2015), http://www.bls.gov/op
ub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/archive/labor-force-characteristics-by-race-and-ethni
city-2014.pdf (illustrating the disparities in the average percentage of individuals
employed “by occupation, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity” in 2014).
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practice cases, provided for under section 707 of Title VII, are a key
component of the statute’s enforcement scheme. Per Congress’s
design, these cases authorize the government to target employers who
systematically discriminate against their employees and job applicants.
When the government brings a pattern-or-practice case, it seeks to
vindicate the public’s interest in ensuring equal employment
opportunity. Pattern-or-practice cases also enable the government to
hold employers accountable for unlawful discrimination that litigation
based solely on individuals’ charges may not reach.
In the decades since Title VII was enacted, defendant employers
have fought to restrict the government’s ability to secure relief for
victims of discrimination.319 Among the statute’s most heavily litigated
provisions is section 707(e), which provides that the EEOC shall
investigate and act upon charges of a pattern or practice of
discrimination “in accordance with the procedures set forth” in section
706.320 Employers argue that this potentially powerful provision for
eradicating discrimination, combined with the limitations period found
in section 706, should be read so narrowly that it limits the class of
victims eligible for relief in a pattern-or-practice suit to those harmed
within 180 or 300 days prior to the underlying charge. The numerous
district courts that have ruled on this issue have reached different
conclusions: while some courts have applied the section 706
limitations period to pattern-or-practice cases, others have not.
A critical examination of Title VII and the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of its provisions demonstrate that Congress did not
intend for section 706’s limitations period to restrict recovery in
EEOC pattern-or-practice cases. First, Congress designed pattern-orpractice cases to provide broad relief. Second, the history and
legislative record of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
indicate that Congress intended to bolster the effectiveness of pattern319. See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss
First Amended Complaint at 30, EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 884 F.
Supp. 2d 499 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (4:11-cv-03425), 2012 WL 1506101 (arguing that the
section 706 limitations period restricts relief in section 707 cases); Defendant’s Reply in
Further Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2–4, EEOC v.
Princeton Healthcare Sys., No. 10-4126, 2012 WL 5185030 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2012), 2012
WL 11789205 (same); Defendant’s Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion to
Dismiss Any Aspects of the Complaint Seeking Relief for Alleged Discrimination Prior
to July 22, 2004 at 1–4, EEOC v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., No. 08-CV-706, 2010 WL 86376
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010), 2009 WL 5002312 (same); Defendants’ Motion to Limit the
Class at 5–12, EEOC v. Custom Cos., Nos. 02 C 3768, 03 C 2293, 2004 WL 765891
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2004), 2003 WL 23683303 (same).
320. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (2012).
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or-practice suits by transferring them to the EEOC. Reading a
provision in the 1972 Act as making pattern-or-practice suits less
effective plainly conflicts with that intent. Third, the actual language
of Title VII does not provide a limitations period for section 707 cases.
Fourth, Title VII’s provision capping back-pay liability at two years
indicates that Congress contemplated restricting employers’ liability
and considered such restrictions distinct from the section 706 filing
period. Fifth, applying the section 706 filing period to restrict relief in
pattern-or-practice cases produces inconsistent outcomes because a
victim’s ability to recover depends on arbitrary factors, such as the
state in which they work or the type of employer for whom they work.
Even if applying the section 706 filing period in section 707 cases
made sense, courts would still be mistaken in restricting relief to acts
that occurred within 180 or 300 days prior to the charge. Like the
hostile work environment described in Morgan,321 a pattern or
practice of discrimination is a continuing violation. Thus, assuming
that the pattern or practice continues into the limitations period, the
EEOC may secure relief for all individuals harmed by the practice
while it was in effect. Arguments that application of the continuing
violation doctrine would be unfair in this context are unfounded
because equitable doctrines and the EEOC’s administrative
procedures protect defendant employers from litigating stale claims.

321. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (noting
that a hostile-work-environment claim is considered a singular practice that consists
of a series of separate acts), superseded in part by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).

